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OF JUSTICE’S KOSOVO OPINION 
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS* 
The International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Advisory Opinion is a 
masterpiece of avoidance. The Court has lived to run another day, and one 
can only admire the judges’ skill in arriving at the vacant place between 
difficult and clashing conclusions of substance. Still, in the wake of the 
Opinion, questions inevitably arise: Of what use is this document? Has it 
advanced a project of justice, or of law? The Opinion has done something, 
though not, perhaps, what it purports to do. To understand it, we must 
engage this cautious, crimped document in its full context—or rather, we 
must understand the ways in which the Opinion itself comprehensively 
avoids any engagement with context. Its caution and its crimped nature are 
themselves features illuminating the self-image, role, and limited value of 
the Court. 
This Article argues that in the Kosovo Opinion, the International 
Court of Justice assiduously asserted its own jurisdictional, interpretative, 
and institutional prerogatives, at the cost of avoiding the momentous 
questions about secession and self-determination with which the Court was 
so clearly confronted. These two outcomes are related: The avoidance of 
substance and the assertion of prerogative were achieved by the selfsame 
maneuvers of definition and interpretation. Faced with a choice between 
emphasizing its own authority and actually engaging the question, the 
Court chose to invest in itself—but it did not, in turn, use that investment to 
any substantive end. The Opinion exhibits a misplaced boldness, advancing 
its procedural agenda but saying—almost literally—nothing in the process. 
This Article also considers what a bolder Opinion might have looked 
like, by comparing the Opinion to the Canadian Supreme Court’s seminal 
 
  *      Humboldt Experienced Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law; Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law – Bloomington. 
JD Harvard; MIA Columbia; BA UCLA. Email: tiwaters@indiana.edu. Thanks to Profs. Florian Bieber, 
Mark Drumbl, Hurst Hannum, Jenny Martinez, Marko Milanović, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Várady 
Tibor, David Wippman, Bart Szewczyk, and audiences at the Association for the Study of Nationalities 
annual conference at Columbia University and the Zentrum für Südosteuropastudien, Karl-Franzens-
Universität Graz for comments, and to Katherine Allison, Laura Heft, Huong Nguyen, and Carla 
Tumbas for research assistance. 
WATERS FINAL VERSION 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013  11:09 AM 
268 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:267 
Reference re Secession of Quebec. This comparative exercise helps us to 
understand why questions of self-determination are easier to avoid than to 
decide—why it is hard even to talk about them in coherent and productive 
terms, and thus why one must feel sympathy for the seemingly impossible 
task facing the ICJ—but also to see that another, bolder language is in fact 
possible. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO SAY SOMETHING 
 
The manager of a fruit-and-vegetable shop places in 
his window, among the onions and carrots, the slogan: 
“Workers of the world, unite!” Why does he do it? . . . 
. . . He put them all into the window simply because it 
has been done that way for years, because everyone does 
it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to 
refuse, there could be trouble. . . . 
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. . . 
Let us now imagine that one day something in our 
greengrocer snaps and he stops putting up the slogans 
merely to ingratiate himself. . . . He rejects the ritual and 
breaks the rules of the game. He discovers once more his 
suppressed identity and dignity. He gives his freedom a 
concrete significance. His revolt is an attempt to live within 
the truth. 
The bill is not long in coming. . . . 
—Václav Havel1  
 
Let us begin, as we shall also end, by acknowledging the great 
trepidation the judges of the International Court of Justice must have felt on 
hearing the news that their opinion on Kosovo’s independence would be 
sought.2 A momentous issue, but also a complex and fraught question, so 
consequentially implicated in the sweep of grave and violent events: How 
could one look away from the risks incumbent in such an undertaking? 
How could one possibly reach a just, considered, and efficacious view in 
the wake of all that had so recently happened in Kosovo, and knowing what 
a decision—if taken seriously—might yet bring to pass? Really, what could 
one say? 
Easy answers to the legal question before the Court seemed 
tantalizingly available to those partisan enough to grasp after them. But 
those ready outcomes were as impervious to reflection as they were 
rehearsed; the adamantine preferences of the contesting parties—Serbia 
and its allies, Kosovo and its—would not simply bend to the inclinations of 
robed men and women in The Hague. Armies had clashed and killed over 
this question and this land; they would not move, no matter what was 
decided. Worse, they might, in bloody contradiction of the Court’s writ. 
And still, for all that, an opinion would be sought, and something must 
be said. There would be no shying away from that. Or . . . . 
 
 1.  VÁCLAV HAVEL ET AL., THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS AGAINST THE STATE IN 
CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 27, 39 (John Keane ed., 1985). 
 2.  See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, 2010 I.C.J. 500, ¶ 1 (July 22), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15999.pdf [hereinafter Bennouna Dissent] (“Before turning to 
the reasons which have prevented me from concurring with the Opinion of the Court, I should first like 
to consider the propriety of the Court embarking on an exercise that is so hazardous for it, as the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, by responding to the request for an advisory opinion. . . 
.”); Marc Weller, Modesty can be a Virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?, 24 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 127, 130 (2011) [hereinafter Weller, Modesty] (referring to “the high stakes in this case”). 
On the name “Kosovo,” see infra note 13. 
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*     *     * 
 
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ, the Court) Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion3 is a masterpiece of avoidance. The Court has lived to run another 
day, and one can only admire the judges’ skill in arriving at the vacant 
place between difficult and clashing conclusions of substance—as well as 
wonder at what Serbia was thinking when it put the precise question it did. 
Still, in the wake of the Opinion, questions inevitably arise: Of what use is 
this document? Has it advanced a project of justice, or of law? How does 
one make something bold out of such timidity? 
In considering the Opinion’s value, there are obvious technical 
objections—the narrow precision of the terms of reference, the stupefying 
formalism of the judges’ approach, the merely advisory nature of the 
Opinion—that might explain its timid quality. We will consider these 
factors, but of course the Opinion is hardly the first anodyne, non-binding 
document issued on a question of international law, and some of them have 
achieved quite a bit.4 We must look elsewhere to see why this document is 
so thoroughly inconsequential. The Opinion has done something—though 
not what it purports to do—but to see what, we must engage this cautious, 
crimped document in its full jurisprudential and political context. We must 
understand the ways in which the Opinion itself comprehensively and 
consciously avoids any engagement with context: its caution and its 
crimped nature are themselves features illuminating the self-image, role, 
and limited value of the Court. 
In the Kosovo Opinion, the ICJ has assiduously asserted its own 
jurisdictional, interpretative, and institutional prerogatives, at the cost of 
avoiding the momentous questions about secession and self-determination 
that so clearly confronted it. These two moves are related: the assertion of 
prerogative and the avoidance of substance were achieved by the selfsame 
 
 3.  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf [hereinafter Opinion]. 
 4.   The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the paradigmatic example—a non-binding 
document that has, by general consent, attained the status of customary international law. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). A 
recent example is the Paris Principles regulating child soldiers: see MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING 
CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2012). Another example, which we will consider 
at length at the end of this Article, is the non-binding Reference re Secession of Quebec (Quebec 
Reference), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). Outside of law, of course, philosophers and public intellectuals 
regularly make arguments of great consequence, even though they are not generally perceived as having 
any formal authority. 
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maneuvers of definition and interpretation. 
Faced with a choice between emphasizing its own authority and 
actually engaging the issue before it, the Court chose to invest in itself, but 
it did not, in turn, use that investment to any substantive end—at least, not 
that we can yet see. The Court exhibited a misplaced boldness, advancing a 
procedurally ambitious agenda but saying—almost literally—nothing in the 
process. 
All of this we may discern this from a close reading of the Opinion’s 
text, undertaken in the following way: After first identifying the context in 
which the Court deliberated, the Article examines the nature and 
implications of the question the United Nations General Assembly posed to 
the Court. We will see that the question implicated highly indeterminate 
bodies of law but was, in fact, clear enough for the Court to engage with, 
had it wished to. Then, the Article dissects the Court’s approach to the 
question, showing how its densely procedural technique selectively frames 
the question in ways that assert the Court’s authority while simultaneously 
stripping all substance from the analysis. 
This Article examines a particular case in its own context, but clearly 
it relates to a more general question about the nature of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The Court itself locates the Opinion within its own 
jurisprudence, allowing us to see how the procedural assertiveness and 
substantive vacancy that the Court produces is not sui generis, but 
patterned. But this Article is not a longitudinal accounting of how the ICJ 
balances institutional and substantive concerns in its general jurisprudence; 
rather, it closely reads a single case that itself reveals a great deal about the 
contemporary Court. 
Finally, the Article includes a comparative exercise, considering what 
a bolder Court might have done by comparing the Opinion to the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s seminal Reference re Secession of Quebec.5 This 
comparative and counterfactual exercise is necessary not only to 
understand why questions of self-determination are easier to avoid than to 
decide—why it is hard even to talk about them in coherent and productive 
terms, and thus why one must feel sympathy for the seemingly impossible 
task facing the Court—but also to see that another language is in fact 
possible. 
This approach—combining a comparative study with a close reading 
of the least exciting parts of the document—should give us a foundation to 
evaluate the Opinion: sympathy for the judges who faced a difficult task; 
admiration for their skill in avoiding the profoundest questions; and a 
 
 5.  Quebec Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
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critical assessment of what the Kosovo Opinion tells us about the Court that 
chose to issue such a document. 
I. A TERRITORY IN DISPUTE: THE CONTEXT OF THE OPINION 
In considering the Opinion as an institutional artifact—in order to 
appreciate the conundrum that confronted the judges in October 2008—we 
must have in mind the key contextual elements that surrounded their 
deliberations:6 the de facto independence of Kosovo, under a NATO 
security umbrella, after almost a decade of indeterminate status under a 
U.N. administration, with an ethnic Albanian majority absolutely 
determined to defend that independence, counterpoised against the 
adamantine opposition of Serbia, all playing out against the preferences of 
states with decided views about Kosovo’s independence and the propriety 
of self-determination and secession. These conflicting factors produced a 
conundrum for the ICJ. For this was no mere border delimitation or dispute 
over rocks unable to sustain human habitation—the kinds of cases for 
which states had often turned to the Court, about which the Court is 
reasonably able to produce clear answers, and after which states might 
actually be inclined to acquiesce in the judgment7—but a dispute about the 
formation of states. In these circumstances, the Court’s well-known 
“culture of deference to sovereignty”8—itself not merely metaphysical but 
keenly appreciative of the effective power that generally accompanies 
sovereignty—was of little use; here, the sovereign was no longer exercising 
any power, but to recognize a new sovereign would deeply offend the 
sensibilities and interests of other states, still in full control of their own 
frontiers yet worried about secession. Simple deference to sovereignty 
would not yield a legal answer consistent with the lines and dictates of 
power. 
 
 6.  The Court itself reviews what it considers the relevant factual background, beginning with 
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 57-76. 
 7.  See infra Part I.C.  
 8.  Thomas M. Franck & Peter Prows, The Role of Presumptions in International Tribunals, 4 
LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 197, 242-43 (2005) (discussing Indonesia/Malaysia, and noting 
that “Precisely because of their similar backgrounds in the service of government, judges at the ICJ 
share a common perception of the limits of their craft, which they tend to impose on themselves, and 
share, also, an excessive deference to the traditional notions of sacrosanct sovereignty” and referring to 
“the powerful common culture of the judiciary: a culture of deference to sovereignty and a reluctance to 
be seen to make any more law then absolutely necessary.”). 
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A. History of the Territory and Dispute to 19999 
The territory whose declaration of independence was at issue before 
the Court had long been populated by a variety of communities, the largest 
of which are Albanians and Serbs. The Serbs are overwhelmingly Orthodox 
Christian and Slavic-speaking, while Albanians are predominantly Sunni 
Muslim and speak an Indo-European language not closely related to any 
other in the region. The demographic balance is one of the sources of 
controversy between partisans of the two communities, but it is clear that at 
least from the early twentieth century, Albanians formed a majority of the 
territory’s population; by the time Yugoslavia collapsed, they were an 
overwhelming majority, nearly 90%.10 Though complex, intercommunal 
relations between Serbs and Albanians have historically been more distant 
than those between ethnic groups in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.11 
Certainly, by the time the Court was asked for the Opinion, relations were 
extremely hostile.12 
Throughout most of its history, the area known as Kosovo13 has not 
 
 9.  On the history, ethnography, languages, demography and politics of Kosovo, see generally 
NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY (1998); MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND 
ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOSOVO (1998); JULIE A. MERTUS, KOSOVO: HOW MYTHS AND TRUTHS 
STARTED A WAR (1999). SABRINA RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1962-
1991 (1992). 
 10.  See SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD 
WAR 34-35 (1995) (citing to “Preventing War in Kosovo” [Lund, Sweden: Transnational Foundation 
for Peace and Future Research, 9 July 1992, at 14]). The last official census in Yugoslavia, in 1991, 
showed Albanians and Serbs as 82.2 and 9.9 percent of the population, respectively. See TIM JUDAH, 
KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 313 (2000) (citing data from Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1992, 
[sic] godinu at 62-63, in Milan Vučković and Goran Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova u razdoblju od 1918. 
do 1991. godine (Munich, 1996), at 108-09). These figures have been contested by partisans on both 
sides. See YU-WEN CHEN, TRANSITIONAL COOPERATION OF ETHNOPOLITICAL MOBILIZATION: A 
SURVEY ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ETHNOPOLITICAL GROUPS 161 (2009) (referring to the dispute 
between Serbs and Albanians over the actual percentage of the Albanian population in Kosovo at the 
time of the census). 
 11.  See, e.g., TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 1-32 (2000) (reviewing the history of 
Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the 
Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 390 (2003) (“The history of the 
territory of Kosovo is marked by near perpetual competition for sovereign control between Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs. Throughout the history of the competition, sovereignty has ebbed and flowed 
from Kosovar Albanians to the Serbs and back again.”); Stephen Kinzer, Ethnic Conflict is Threatening 
in Yet Another Region of Yugoslavia: Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/09/world/ethnic-conflict-is-threatening-in-yet-another-region-of-
yugoslavia-kosovo.html?scp=9&sq=ethnic%20hostility%20in%20kosovo&st=cse (“For the Serbs who 
rule them, they [Kosovar Albanians] feel only resentment and hostility.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., Kosovo’s Independence, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Feb. 2009),  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/country/kosovos-independence.aspx; Dan 
Bilefsky, Kosovo Declared Its Independence from Serbia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html. 
 13.  The area is known as “Kosova” in Albanian, and as “Kosovo i Metohija,” or more commonly, 
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had a separate political identity. Once a part of the medieval kingdom of 
Serbia, then long a part of the Ottoman Empire, it was briefly incorporated 
into the Kingdom of Serbia before the First World War—and afterward 
into the new Royal Yugoslavia. Under the reconstituted post-war socialist 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia, with 
the borders it now possesses.14 
In the early years of the new Yugoslav state, this formal autonomy 
meant relatively little, and indeed, Kosovo was the site of considerable 
repression into the 1960s. The 1974 federal Constitution introduced 
thorough-going political decentralization.15 Though still not de jure a 
republic, Kosovo became an effectively separate unit from Serbia with its 
own representation in the federal government.16 Albanian—the language of 
the great majority of the population—also became the principal language of 
governance, and Albanians increasingly dominated social and political life. 
In 1981, Albanian demands for republican status were put down with 
federal intervention.17 
Some Serbs, both within the province and in Serbia proper, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the circumstances of Serbs in Kosovo and the threat to 
Serbia’s formal sovereignty over the autonomous province; from the mid-
1980s, with increasing political drift and economic crisis in Yugoslavia and 
the reappearance of nationalist discourse, Kosovo became a rallying point 
for Serbian opinion.18 Slobodan Milošević, an important official in the 
 
“Kosovo,” in Serbian. This article follows the ICJ’s and common English-language practice of referring 
to “Kosovo,” but—as also appears to be true for the Court—no bias is intended by this. 
 14.  See ARTA ANTE, STATE BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN? 
EXPLORING THE CASE OF KOSOVO 139-43 (2010). 
 15.  Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Gazette of the SFRY, 
Vol. 30/9, Feb. 21 1974. See WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 29-41 (1995). 
 16.  Yugoslavia consisted of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia—and two autonomous provinces within Serbia—Kosovo and Metohija, 
and Vojvodina. Kosovo’s greater autonomy included effective veto power over federal legislation and a 
seat on the collective presidency that governed after Tito’s death in 1980. Constitution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Gazette of the SFRY, Vol. 30/9, Feb. 21, 1974. See 
WOODWARD, supra note 10, at 29-41; Gordana Božić, The Communist Ideological Legacy and Serb-
Albanian Relations in Kosovo, 37 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 33 (2009); SABRINA RAMET, NATIONALISM 
AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1962-1991 (1992). 
 17.  FLORIAN BIEBER & ŽIDAS DASKALOVSKI, UNDERSTANDING THE WAR IN KOSOVO 33 (2003) 
(“The 1981 Albanian demonstrations and the harsh government reaction only radicalized the Albanian 
population.”); Joseph Marko, Independence without Standards: Kosovo’s Interethnic Relations Since 
1999, 5 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 219, 220 (2005-2006) (discussing the violent suppression of the 
Kosovo Albanian population after the 1981 protests). 
 18.  Momčilo Pavlović, Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974-1990, in CONFRONTING THE YUGOSLAV 
CONTROVERSIES: A SCHOLARS’ INITIATIVE 66-67 (Charles Ingrao & Thomas A. Emmert, eds., 2009) 
(“The political change [referring to increased federal intervention in Kosovo’s affairs] raised the 
expectations of Kosovo Serbs that the authorities would fully address their concerns. Soon, however, 
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Communist Party of Serbia, rose rapidly to a position of dominance with 
Serbian politics in significant part by attaching himself to a Serbian 
nationalist agenda in defense of Serbs in Kosovo. In 1989, Milošević 
engineered the effective revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy and its 
resubordination to Belgrade.19 
Under Belgrade’s direct rule, Serbs reasserted control. Albanians were 
excluded from government and employment, and the Albanian language 
was demoted; although less than 10% of the population, Serbs dominated 
the government, cultural institutions, and economy of the province.20 
In response, a nonviolent Albanian resistance movement developed, 
organizing parallel health and educational institutions for Albanians and 
seeking diplomatic support for independence or restored autonomy. 
Kosovo’s parallel Albanian leadership first declared the province a republic 
and then declared its independence in 1991, and organized a referendum 
that was overwhelmingly supported by ethnic Albanians but almost entirely 
ignored by other states.21 Serbia’s control continued without external 
challenge. 
In 1991 and 1992, the crisis of the Yugoslav state became general, 
with several republics seceding and protracted wars breaking out in Croatia 
and Bosnia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively 
dissolved; Kosovo, reabsorbed into Serbia, became part of the new federal 
union of Montenegro and Serbia known as the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). 
From about 1996, armed resistance groups began operating in Kosovo. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) took the lead in challenging Serbian 
security forces, which responded with violent crackdowns and reprisals. By 
early 1998, the KLA was fielding a significant guerrilla force, and Serbian 
police and military forces were fully engaged in the province.22 By the end 
 
many from the community felt that the new policy did not begin to address all of their concerns, and 
emigration continued.”). 
 19.  Jure Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 787 (2009). 
 20.  Michael W. Manulak, Canada and the Kosovo Crisis, 64 INT’L J. 565, 566 (2009) (“In 1989, 
Milošević coerced the Kosovo assembly into amending its constitution, repealing the educational and 
linguistic autonomy of the Kosovar Albanians. . . .”). 
 21.  Vidmar, supra note 19, at 789-90 (“Following the referendum, the underground parliament 
declared independence on October 19, 1991. Only Albania recognized Kosovo’s independence.”). 
 22.  The military forces were the federal Vojska Jugoslavije—the Army of Yugoslavia—and 
therefore not strictly Serbian. However, Milošević’s control over the other federal unit, Montenegro, 
had considerably weakened during the 1990s, and military operations in Kosovo were largely the 
domain of Milošević and elements of the Serbian government. While the precise identity of the armed 
forces operating in Kosovo during the war is an issue of considerable importance for the cases before 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it is not particularly important for the 
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of the year, 350,000 Albanians had been internally displaced or had fled 
across the frontiers into Albania and Macedonia.23 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) increasingly pressed 
Serbia for a negotiated solution to the situation in Kosovo; following a 
brief and ineffectual ceasefire and a failed peace conference, NATO began 
aerial bombardment of Serbia in March 1999. The operation was not 
authorized by the Security Council, and gave rise to considerable debate 
about the conditions under which military or humanitarian intervention 
could occur.24 
Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, Serbian forces 
radically increased their attacks on Albanians and expelled over 800,000, 
or almost half the population, from the province.25 The KLA continued 
fighting during this time, and NATO continued bombing, not only in 
Kosovo but throughout Serbia. After seventy-eight days, in early June, the 
FRY and NATO signed the Kumanovo Agreement, which provided for the 
withdrawal of Serb police and military forces from Kosovo and the entry of 
NATO forces, known as the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).26 Serbian 
power in Kosovo was definitively broken, replaced with a restored Kosovar 
Albanian majority backed by NATO. Serbs retained effective control of 
areas north of the Ibar River to the border with Serbia proper, in an area in 
which they had been numerically predominant before the war.27 
 
Opinion. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, Pavković, Lazarević & Lukić, Case 
No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 245 (Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing terminology for armed forces in relation 
to Serbia and the FRY and noting that “no Serbian army existed during the relevant Indictment period. 
Rather the Yugoslav Army (‘VJ’) was the only official armed force, representing the FRY as a 
whole.”).  
 23.  Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s 
Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 397 (2003) (“The results of the new campaign of 
Serbian ethnic aggression [in 1998] were that over 350,000 civilians were displaced and over 18,000 
homes were deliberately destroyed, and almost half of the population centers were subject to siege.”). 
 24.  See, e.g., David Wippmann, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT’L 
L. J. 129 (2001); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM 
AFTER KOSOVO (2001); INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED (2000) [hereinafter “KOSOVO REPORT”]. 
 25.  KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 24, at 304; UNHCR, Refugees and IDPs from Kosovo (2000), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bafe4.html; Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment (Feb. 26, 
2009);.OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., 
KOSOVO/KOSOVA: AS SEEN, AS TOLD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FINDINGS OF THE OSCE 
KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION, OCTOBER 1998 TO JUNE 1999 ch. 14 (1999), available at 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/17772?download=true. 
 26.  Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, June 9, 2009, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm.  
 27.  A large number of Serbs left the province, but the majority of those who remained stayed in 
small enclaves throughout the southern, Albanian-dominated parts of Kosovo. By far the single largest 
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B. The Territory and Dispute after 1999 until the Request for the Advisory 
Opinion28 
The United Nations had not authorized the NATO engagement, but 
shortly after the termination of the conflict, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1244, effectively approving the NATO presence and 
establishing the United Nations Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The 
provisions that were to be of greatest interest to the Court a few years later 
concerned both the process for determining Kosovo’s final status and the 
nature of the governance institutions established in the meantime. 
Resolution 1244 included several ambiguous provisions on the status 
of Kosovo and the means for determining a final resolution. The Resolution 
reaffirmed the FRY’s sovereignty,29 but also encroached on that 
sovereignty in systematic ways and indicated that a changed political status 
would result, since the new international civil presence established by the 
Resolution was charged with: 
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of 
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo . . .; 
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional 
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a 
political settlement, including the holding of elections;30 
 
group of Serbs, however—a third or more of the total—reside in the north, where the Pristina 
government’s authority is minimal. Even in the southern enclaves, Belgrade continues to wield 
considerable authority and funds much of the local infrastructure and civil service. Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network, Kosovo Serbs Denounce Integration and ‘Traitors,’ BALKAN INSIGHT, Jan. 31, 
2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-serbs-rally-against-their-integration-into-kosovo. 
 28.  On this period, see MARC WELLER, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1989-1999: FROM THE 
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO RAMBOUILLET AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES (1999). This is 
also the period that the Opinion’s own historical overview covers. Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 57-76. The 
Opinion does not deal with events prior to 1999, though it mentions some of them by reference, for 
example through discussion of the provisions of Resolution 1244, which itself mentions earlier events. 
 29.  S.C. Res. 1244, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (“Reaffirming the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other States of the region.”).  Serbia is not actually mentioned—a point which 
tempted some observers to argue that, with the replacement of the FRY by the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro in 2003, and the subsequent division of that state in 2006, Serbia itself had no claim to 
Kosovo. See, e.g., Written Statement by the United States of America, Sec. IV, Advisory Opinion, 2009 
I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 17), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf.  This reading found 
little traction, however: the law of succession does not easily support it; as a matter of protocol, a 
Security Council resolution would be addressed to the FRY (and therefore would not necessarily 
prejudice the rights of sub-state entities); and, perhaps, there was a pragmatic recognition that Serbia 
was in fact the relevant party. See, e.g., Andreas Zimmermann & Carsten Stahn, Yugoslav Territory, 
United Nations Trusteeship Over Sovereign State- Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status 
of Kosovo 70 NORDIC. J. INT’L L. 423, 427 (2001) (referring to Kosovo as being within Yugoslavia’s 
territory but also to Serbia’s rejection of S.C. Res. 1244).  
 30.  S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, ¶ 11(d) (The international civil presence was also supposed to 
“[t]ransfer[ ], as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing 
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. . . 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future 
status . . .; 
. . . 
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s 
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political 
settlement . . . .31 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Resolution also authorized the creation of governance institutions, 
which were later established by the Secretary General,32 and rolled back 
any legal provisions enacted since March 1989—that is, since the 
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy.33 
The KLA was formally disbanded, but its forces constituted the bulk 
of the new security forces, and its leadership became prominent in the new 
 
and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building 
activities.”).  
 31.  Id. ¶ 11 (noting that for subparagraph (a) this should be done “taking full account of annex 2 
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)” and, for subparagraph (e), “taking into account the 
Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)”). Annex 2 refers to “[a] political process towards the establishment 
of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, 
taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the [FRY] and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of [the KLA]. Negotiations 
between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-
governing institutions.” Id. annex 2, ¶ 8. The Rambouillet Accords describe governance structures for 
Kosovo. Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, U.S. 
Dep’t State, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. 
 32.  S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, ¶ 10; U.N. Secretary-General, Report Of The Secretary-
General On The United Nations Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo, ¶¶ 110-16, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999); U.N. Secretary-General, Report Of The Secretary-General On The United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/987 (Sept. 16, 1999), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/267/07/IMG/N9926707.pdf?OpenElement 
(describing many of the structures and early regulations). 
 33.  UNMIK regulations originally provided for the continuity of the legal regime in effect prior 
to 24 March 1999—therefore excluding wartime provisions but leaving the post-autonomy legal regime 
in place—but in December 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary General promulgated a 
new regulation providing that the law governing Kosovo would consist of laws under the Constitutional 
Framework (that is, UNMIK and SRSG regulation) and “[t]he law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 
1989[.]” See Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 61 (citing UNMIK Regulation 1999/25, UNMIK/REG/1999/24 
(Dec. 12, 1999)). 
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civilian administration.34 Neither UNMIK nor the new Kosovar provisional 
governance entities wielded effective authority in the Serb north—nor do 
they today.35 
As contemplated in Resolution 1244, and after elections in May 2001, 
UNMIK established a Constitutional Framework for the Provisional Self-
Government of Kosovo, leading to the creation of the “Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Governance” (PISG).36 These included an executive and 
a parliament, operating under the aegis of the international civil presence 
and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, who had broad 
authority to supervise and veto acts of the provisional institutions. 
UNMIK began a process, termed “Standards before Status,” to 
establish a stable administration before attempting a political settlement.37 
Following violent riots in 2004, however, the Secretary General appointed 
Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of Finland, to negotiate a final status 
agreement for Kosovo. When, to no one’s surprise, negotiations failed, 
Ahtisaari crafted his own set of proposals for radical decentralization and 
extensive minority protections within an independent Kosovo.38 It was on 
 
 34.  See Bureau of Eur. & Eurasian Aff., Background Note: Kosovo, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE: DIPLOMACY IN ACTION (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/kosovo/ 
177369.htm (“Under UNMIK's guidance, Kosovo established new institutions (both at the municipal 
and central levels), held free elections, and established a multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS). 
The KLA was demobilized, with many of its members incorporated into the Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), a civilian emergency services organization. UNMIK gradually turned over more governing 
competencies to local authorities.”).  
 35.  See, e.g., Bojana Barlovac & Fatmir Aliu, Northern Serbs Vote ‘No’ to Kosovo, BALKAN 
INSIGHT, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/99-74-kosovo-serbs-say-no-to-pristina 
(reporting on an unofficial referendum held in Serb areas, with overwhelming vote against Kosovo 
institutions); Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, supra note 27 (discussing continued resistance 
and protests in the north and noting that “[t]he northern segment of Kosovo is beyond the remit of the 
Pristina government”). 
 36.  UNMIK, Regulation 2001/19, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/19 (May 15, 2001) 
(subsequently amended by UNMIK Regulations 2002/9 of May 3, 2002, and 2007/29 of October 4, 
2007), cited in Written Statement by the United States of America, Sec. IV, Advisory Opinion, 2009 
I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 17), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf.  
 37.  See, e.g., Joseph Marko, Independence without Standards: Kosovo’s Interethnic Relations 
since 1999, 5 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 219 (2005-2006). But cf. Paul R. Williams, Earned 
Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 387, 394 (2003) (“At its essence, the standards before status approach simply suspends the 
political discussion over final status and sets in motion the construction of Kosovar institutions which 
will likely ensure an independent Kosovo.”). 
 38.  Vidmar, supra note 19, at 801 (“After more than a year of unproductive negotiations and 
occasional outbursts of ethnic violence, the U.N. Secretary-General addressed a document to the 
President of the Security Council on March 26, 2007, entitled ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status’ (the Ahtisaari Plan), in which he recommended 
independence supervised by the international community.”). See also David Wippmann, Building the 
Rule of Law in Kosovo, 104 ASIL PROC. 366 (2010) (discussing the governance of Kosovo). 
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the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan that, on February 17, 2008, members of 
Kosovo’s parliament and its President—though not necessarily those 
institutions as such, since in the Opinion’s analysis the difference is not 
semantic, as we shall see—declared the independence of Kosovo. 
Thus at the time the Court heard and considered the request for an 
opinion, most of Kosovo was already in fact independent of Serbia, a 
situation unlikely to be changed by Court’s deliberations, just as Serbia’s 
continued resistance was equally given. Poised between these two 
unyielding and determined views—and caught between the unreconciled 
positions of its masters on the Security Council—UNMIK took no formal 
view on the territory’s final status, and continued to operate. 
To this we must add the rapid recognition of Kosovo by a sizable 
number of states, including the United States and many of the most 
important actors in the European architecture39—here too, however, 
counterpoised against non-recognition by the majority of the world’s states, 
including a small number of EU members and several major global 
powers.40 It strains the imagination to suppose that any of the states 
publicly committed on either side would have altered their position in 
response to any opinion issued by the Court. Indeed, the continued 
operation of UNMIK was itself a result of this stand-off, since Serbia’s 
allies effectively forbade the U.N. to dissolve its operation or concede 
ultimate authority to the new state. 
C. The International Court of Justice as a Venue for Continuing the 
Conflict 
Finally, to this historical and political context we may add the 
existence of the ICJ itself, a jurisdiction available to the parties as a 
 
 39.  In total, sixty-nine states had recognized Kosovo before the General Assembly approved 
Serbia’s request to the ICJ, including a clear majority of EU states. Andrew Solomon, The Road Ahead 
for Kosovo’s Independence, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION UP FRONT BLOG (July 23, 2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0723_kosovo_solomon.aspx.  See also International 
Recognition of Kosovo, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013) (giving the date on which each state formally recognized Kosovo’s 
sovereignty, and links to embassy websites confirming each state’s recognition). 
 40.  These included Russia, China and India. Within the EU, Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and 
Romania have not recognized Kosovo. Just prior to the declaration of independence, the European 
Union inserted a new administrative apparatus, EULEX, which was intended to provide governance 
support without taking a position on Kosovo’s status. Vidmar, supra note 19, at 804-05 (“On February 
16, 2008 (one day prior to the declaration of independence), the EU Council launched the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which aimed ‘to support the Kosovo authorities in 
their efforts to build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system.’” The new mission’s goals 
expressly noted that “the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will continue to exercise its 
executive authority under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. EULEX Kosovo will not replace 
UNMIK but rather support, mentor, monitor and advise the local authorities”). 
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strategic alternative for advancing their goals. The Court is the principal 
judicial organ for the U.N. system, intended to provide judgments and, as 
here, advisory opinions on important issues affecting the international legal 
order.41 
The ICJ Statute expressly permits the Court to issue advisory opinions 
on questions submitted by bodies authorized by the U.N. Charter;42 the 
Charter, in turn, indicates that the General Assembly may request them.43 
So long as the matter refers to “any legal question,” the Court’s jurisdiction 
is textually amenable. The Court has been asked for advisory opinions 
twenty-six times,44 and the resulting opinions have “sometimes been useful 
in obtaining authoritative answers to legal questions of general institutional 
concern.”45 But the question posed in this case was the opposite of that—it 
was a particular, political contestation. The Kosovo inquiry was a rare case 
of a highly divisive question, very specific in form, that deeply concerned a 
very large number of states.46 
The ICJ has considered a number of disputes involving sovereignty 
and territory, as this one did: maritime delimitations,47 including fisheries 
 
 41.  Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 1, 36, 65-68, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179; 
59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 933; 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945),, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org//documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].   
 42.  Id. art. 65(1). 
 43.  U.N. Charter art. 96, para. a. (“1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request 
the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.”). The Court cites this, Opinion, supra note 
3, ¶ 20, and further notes that it does not need to inquire as to if the matter is in the “scope of the 
activities” of the GA (as it does do for some other organs). See also Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 19 (citing 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion, 1982 I.C.J. 1, at 333-334, ¶ 21). 
 44.  See List of Advisory Proceedings Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date of Introduction, 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4 (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2013).  Twenty-four of these preceded the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, while one has been 
issued since. Id. See also Press Release, I.C.J., The General Assembly of the United Nations Requests 
an Advisory Opinion from the Court on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, I.C.J. 
Press Release No. 2008/34 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/14797.pdf.  
 45.  SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 106 (1989).    
 46.  See Thomas Burri, Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links, 
11 GERMAN L.J. 881, 881 (2010) (noting that “it is a rare occurrence that such a situation comes to the 
Court. The regular case, if there is such a thing, before the Court has tended to be a relatively low-
profile interstate dispute. The Kosovo incidence [sic] had only come to the Court in the first place—like 
the case of the Wall on the West Bank, the other recent high-profile exception—because the detour via 
the United Nations General Assembly had been open.”). See also Pieter H.F. Bekker, The World 
Court’s Ruling Regarding Israel’s West Bank Barrier and the Primacy of International Law: An 
Insider’s Perspective, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 553, 559 (2005) (noting Judge Burgenthal’s lone dissent 
against the Court’s acceptance of the Wall advisory question). 
 47.  A recent example is Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 
I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 3). 
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jurisdictions and title to uninhabitable rocks; continental shelf cases; and 
frontier disputes. The Court appears to have ruled more often in favor of 
the current possessor, though this tells us nothing certain about the Court’s 
relationship to power, as a possessor may have the better legal claim.48 
Equally, there are cases in which the Court has reached conclusions at 
variance with the lines of control.49 Here, too, it is very hard to say for sure 
what this means, since the broader political framework—as in, say, the 
Southwest Africa cases—might have meant the present possessor was 
diplomatically isolated.  
The Court has never put the matter in these terms, instead resting its 
decisions on analyses of title and past effectivités that might have created 
title. The very concept of effectivités—describing a state’s perfection of 
title through concrete acts expressing sovereignty—can tend to bring 
analysis of title into conformity with the reality of factual control.50 But the 
Court has been clear that effectivités provide evidence of perfected title, not 
that they give grounds to substitute for existing title.51 The continental shelf 
cases presented claims that were, in significant part, novel, since they 
involved areas previously within the high seas commonage. In these cases, 
the Court has generally evinced a greater scope to devise novel solutions 
unencumbered by the fact of possession, and focused instead on equitable 
principles also commonly used in maritime disputes.52 
The related question of compliance is complex. On the one hand, the 
record of compliance is reasonably good and getting better, with far fewer 
states openly defying or failing to appear. On the other, this may reflect 
self-selection, as many of the contentious cases are in fact brought to the 
Court by special agreement between the parties.53 Clearly such cases are 
 
 48.  See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
(Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12 (May 23); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 625 (Dec. 17) (both reaching territorial awards 
generally consistent with the existing control of territory). 
 49.  See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria [“Bakassi 
Peninsula”] (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea Intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10); Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). 
 50.  Cf. The Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1928). 
 51.  See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ 
Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between Cameroon and Nigeria, 10 AFR. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 13, 30 (2002) (discussing the Court’s reasoning on this in Bakassi Peninsula). 
 52.  See, e.g., P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of 
African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, 7 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 159, 201-02 (1998) 
(describing how, in Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), the Court rejected both Tunisia’s and Libya’s 
preferred approaches and devised its own delimitation method). 
 53.  See CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 407 (2004) (showing the large number of territorial disputes submitted by agreement). 
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only imperfectly analogous to the situation here: no one could characterize 
Serbia and Kosovo as in any way willing to mutually accept whatever 
decision the Court might have rendered.54 When the Court has been 
presented with truly contentious cases—in which one party has resisted the 
Court’s jurisdiction or which are highly politicized—its record on ruling 
against power and on compliance is weaker.55 
Literal compliance is not the only way to measure the Court’s 
effectiveness—after all, in an advisory opinion, there is rarely any question 
of literal compliance—nor is a clear, consistent record of boldly ruling 
directly against the interests of the powerful necessary. The Court’s 
judgments may shape or confirm a general opinion, or give aid to actors 
otherwise uncertain about their position, or promote the legitimacy of a 
particular view.56 One could read the Southwest Africa cases in this way, 
for example: no immediate effect on South African rule, but contributing to 
a deepening isolation and delegitimization of the regime’s control. Any 
analysis of the Court’s effect in general must deal with several 
complicating factors: the Court’s changing composition and the greatly 
varying legal and political contexts, both for individual cases and for the 
general environment in which the Court operates.57 
There were other avenues for pursuing a diplomatic strategy to isolate 
and undermine the new state, but Serbia—apparently worried that the 
number of recognitions might reach a tipping point,58 and perhaps seeing an 
 
 54.  Indeed, advisory opinions in general can involve disputes that are more fraught than in actual 
contentious cases. See Richard Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 50, 53 (2011) (“[U]nlike a contentious case in which states have either directly or 
indirectly expressed their consent to adjudication, and implicitly their willingness to comply with the 
outcome reached, an advisory proceeding enables an international law question on very sensitive issues 
to be put to the ICJ in the face of the strenuous objections of concerned states, even leading states.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 55.  See SCHULTE, supra note 53, at 410-13. 
 56.  See Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 54, at 54 (noting that advisory opinions 
such as Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), 
were sought by civil society actors, and that in such a context “an advisory opinion functions as a 
crucial element in ‘legitimacy wars’ fought with soft-power instruments that are nonviolent yet intend 
to be coercive”). 
 57.  On compliance with ICJ decisions generally, see SCHULTE, supra note 53 (but expressly not 
considering advisory opinions); Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions 
of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815 (2007). For a view that the ICJ has become 
increasingly activist, but also noting that the dominant view sees a clear distinction between a legal 
realm in which the Court speaks and a political realm it does or must avoid, see THOMAS J. BODIE, 
POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN ACTIVIST INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1995). 
 58.  If a majority of the world’s states recognized Kosovo, they could also incorporate Kosovo 
into those parts of global institutional architecture that are not subject to Security Council veto or do not 
require unanimity for membership.  See U.N. Charter arts. 3-6.  See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Statement on Membership of the Republic of Kosovo in the IMF, Int’l Monetary Fund Press 
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opportunity to actually reverse, rather than merely freeze, Kosovo’s 
progress towards full independence59—settled upon an approach that 
converted political confrontation into a more refined legal challenge. 
It was in this context that Serbia advanced the idea of seeking the 
ICJ’s view about the legality of Kosovo’s independence. A divided General 
Assembly formally requested an advisory opinion on October 8, 2008.60 At 
the time, this was seen as a considerable tactical victory for Serbia and a 
defeat for Kosovo and the United States.61 And the short-term defensive 
aim of Serbia’s move may have been successful—some more countries 
recognized Kosovo’s independence, but the rate of recognition slowed—
although the causality is speculative.62 
The ICJ itself had encountered the wars of the Yugoslav dissolution, 
and the Kosovo conflict in particular, including in a suite of cases filed by 
the FRY against the NATO powers.63 Merely one year before the Kosovo 
Opinion was requested, the ICJ had issued its decision in Bosnian 
 
Release No. 08/179 (July 15, 2008) (referring to the possibility of the IMF’s accepting Kosovo’s 
application to be a member). 
 59.  See, e.g., Veton Surroi, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: The Beginning of a New Road, 
EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES (Sept. 2010), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ 
The_ICJ_advisory_opinion_on_kosovo__the_beginning_of_a_new_road_01.pdf. 
 60.  GA Res. A/RES/63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8 2008); see ROSENNE, supra note 45, at 
106 (1989) (discussing Cold War opinions, and noting that the practice of requesting advisory opinions 
by majority vote, rather than unanimity “may be one of the factors which has prevented the Court’s 
advisory work from becoming a decisive element in the political evolution of a given issue.”). See also 
General Assembly refers Kosovo situation to ICJ, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/9/853.html (77 states voted in favor, 74 abstained, and 
six voted against Serbia’s proposal). 
 61.  Dan Bilefsky, Gates, in Kosovo, Highlights U.S Balancing Act on Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2008,http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/world/europe/08gates.html?scp=1&sq=october%208,% 
202008%20serbia%20request%20icj&st=cse (referring to the United States’ emphatic opposition to 
partitioning Kosovo and the blow Kosovo would suffer if Serbia won the U.N. vote an advisory 
opinion.). 
 62.  Twenty-one states recognized Kosovo’s independence during the 21 months between the time 
the General Assembly requested the advisory opinion and the day the Opinion was delivered. Two of 
these, Montenegro and Macedonia, recognized Kosovo the day after an opinion was requested, By 
comparison, 47 states had recognized Kosovo during the eight months between the UDI and the 
General Assembly’s request. Since the Opinion was issued, 12 more states have accepted Kosovo’s 
independence. International Recognition of Kosovo, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
International_recognition_of_Kosovo (last visited Jan. 28, 2013); General Assembly refers Kosovo 
situation to ICJ, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/ 
eCache/DEF/9/853.html. 
 63.  See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Application, (Apr. 29, 1999), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=d6&case=105&code=ybe&p3=0; 
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Fr.), Application, 1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29, 1999), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=d6&p3=0&case=107. See also Report of the 
International Court of Justice, Aug. 1, 2003- July 31, 2004, G.A. Res. A/59/4, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 
Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. A/54/4, ¶¶ 7-14 (Sept. 2, 2004).  
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Genocide, which came under considerable criticism.64 The Court thus had 
direct, intimate knowledge of the forces aligned on various sides of the 
issue that now, in a new form, came before it. 
II. THE PERIL OF SUBSTANCE: THE QUESTION ASKED 
To say the General Assembly requested an opinion is to say Serbia 
succeeded in persuading a sufficient number of states to agree to a 
particular question. The question actually asked is the same that Serbia 
initially proposed—it was not altered in the course of the debate65—but it is 
entirely possible that Serbia’s draft question was itself the subject of prior 
informal negotiation, or at least that actors within Serbia took other states’ 
likely reactions into account in devising the original formulation.66 Then 
again, perhaps they did not, and simply wrote the question for reasons that 
made sense internally—or perhaps they did not give it sufficient thought. 
The General Assembly’s Resolution asked the Court to issue an 
advisory opinion on this question: “Is the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in accordance with international law?”67 
This question is amazingly short,68 though the textual apparatus 
 
 64.  Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.  For criticism of the Court’s decision, especially its 
failure to consider evidence from Serbia’s military documents, see, for example, Marko Milanović, 
State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2007); Susana SáCouto, 
Reflections on the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in Bosnia’s Genocide Case Against 
Serbia and Montenegro, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2007). But see C. F. Amerasinghe, The Bosnia 
Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 411, 428 (2008) (describing the case as a significant and positive 
contribution). On the Court’s standard of proof for genocide, see, for example, Berglind Halldórsdóttir 
Birkland, Reining in Non-State Actors: State Responsibility and Attribution in Cases of Genocide, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1641-42 (2009) (“[S]tate responsibility under the Genocide Convention . . . is 
civil, not criminal, in nature . . . [The Court’s] onerous standard—when combined with a strict 
attribution test and a refusal to consider circumstantial evidence of intent—raised the threshold high 
enough effectively to shut the door on most complaints under the Genocide Convention.”); Theodor 
Meron, Breaking Developments in International Law: A Conversation on the ICJ’s Opinion in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 215 (2007). 
 65.  U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 22d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.22 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 66.  It is possible the politics of the question’s formulation affected the Court’s deliberations, but 
it is not necessary to assume this, since the positions of various states were quite clear and would have 
been known to the Court even if it were unaware of what exactly was being negotiated within the 
General Assembly. In any event, the history of the question’s formulation is a factual question, 
amenable to archival investigation, but I have not done this, nor am I aware of others who have. 
 67.  G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 68.  Compare the heavily qualified and referential question underlying another recent, even more 
controversial Advisory Opinion:  
 
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by 
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surrounding it is large69 and became larger still in the course of 
proceedings, as an unusual number of states piled on written comments.70 
 
Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and 
around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering 
the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions?  
 
G.A. Res. A/ES-10/L.16, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.16 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1497.pdf (accompanied by a file of 1067 pages).   
 69.  The question came embedded in a resolution with preambular text, which the Court cited in 
full: 
 
The General Assembly, 
Mindful of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, 
Bearing in mind its functions and powers under the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recalling that on 17 February 2008 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, 
Aware that this act has been received with varied reactions by the Members of the United 
Nations as to its compatibility with the existing international legal order, 
Decides, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations to request 
the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to 
render an advisory opinion on the following question:  
“Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” 
 
Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 1. Attached to this was a large set of materials from the GA debates and the 
U.N. administration of Kosovo. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Request for Advisory Opinion, 2008 I.C.J. 1, (Oct. 10, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=0.  
 70.  Thirty-six states filed written statements, and Kosovo’s PISG, identifying itself as the 
Republic of Kosovo, filed a written contribution; most then filed a second set of written comments, 
amplifying the first statement and reacting to the statements of others. See Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Written 
Statements, I.C.J., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos 
&p3=1 (follow Written Proceedings). This was one of the highest levels of participations for any case at 
the ICJ. See MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE, 1946-2005, at 135-36 (2006)(listing number of states contributing written or oral statements in 
various advisory opinion hearings, with the previous largest involved the Nuclear Weapons and Wall 
cases). It was also the first time that China ever took part in an ICJ hearing, and the first in which all 
five permanent members took part. James Ker-Lindsay, Not Such a ‘Sui Generis’ Case After All: 
Assessing the ICJ Opinion on Kosovo, 39 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 1, 4 (2011).  
In many ways the written statements of the states are more interesting and consequential than the 
Opinion itself, because they can plausibly be construed as evidence of the practice and opinions of 
states on a consequential question—they can be used to make claims about customary international 
law—while the Opinion, for the same reasons we shall examine below, is actually less useful for that 
purpose. In practice, though, the Opinion will likely be used more, such is the tendency of people to 
look to the most official-looking thing lying about. On custom, see generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, 
CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (2010). See also Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination in Regional Human 
Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 80 (2011) (discussing in particular 
African and American states’ submissions). 
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But short as it is—in part because it is so short—the question was, or could 
have been, enormously consequential. 
An important preliminary matter concerns what has been called “the 
question question”71 and which we might phrase this way: “What on earth 
was Serbia thinking?” Criticism of the question Serbia posed has centered 
on how much the question conceded, how it mushily failed to frame an 
unavoidable choice—what the Greeks and rhetoricians call stasis—and 
instead left spacious and ill-considered discretion to the Court.72 We will 
come to the Court’s artful, awkward solution and what it does (and does 
not do) to the question—that is the heart of this Article—but even before 
that, someone considering the question in the context of international law 
and politics could note some concerns about what it does and does not say. 
The question, on its own terms, only speaks about a “declaration of 
independence”—not actually about the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, 
which in naïve (that is to say, substantive) terms is what many people 
would have understood had happened when Kosovo declared 
independence. The question, in other words, focused on the declarative act, 
rather than the effective consequence. 
At first blush, at least to a lawyer, this may seem a wise strategy, since 
secession (outside the colonial context) is traditionally understood as a 
political question not expressly regulated by international law.73 This, 
indeed, is likely why Serbia and its supporters were nervous about any 
 
 71.  Marko Milanović, Univ. of Nottingham Law Sch., Panel Remarks, What the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion Means for the Rest of the World at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law (Mar. 25, 2011); Marko Milanović, Kosovo Advisory Opinion Preview, EJIL: TALK! 
(July 14, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/kosovo-advisory-opinion-preview/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).  
 72.  See, e.g., Milanović, Kosovo Advisory Opinion Preview, supra note 71; Kushtrim Istrefi, 
Limitations of the ICJ Opinion on Kosovo, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RESEARCH (Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2010/08/limitations-of-the-icj-opinion-on-kosovo.php (“Due to the formulation 
of the question, the states— either in support of Serbia or Kosovo—presented their arguments outside 
the scope of the question.”); Christian Tams, The Kosovo Opinion, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-kosovo-opinion/ (stating that “the Court was perfectly justified to answer 
narrowly, as it was asked a narrow question”).  
 73.  See MARCELO G. KOHEN, SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES (2006); see also 
Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism, and 
the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 INT’L J. OF CON. L. 553 (2008); Clifton Van Der 
Linden, Secession: Final Frontier for International Law or Site of Realpolitik Revival, 5 J. INT’L L. & 
INT’L REL. 1, 4-6 (2009); see also Ilana Bet-El, When is a State Not a State? A No to South Ossetia but 
a Yes to Kosovo—The Georgia Conflict Showed Up International Law’s Confusion over Breakaway 
States, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html (“[S]elf-determination is not 
recognised in international law as a basis for the unilateral creation of a new state ‘outside the colonial 
context and apartheid’, and that much of international state practice ‘and the explicit views of major 
powers such as Russia in the Kosovo case stand against it.” (quoting INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING 
MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEOR., 1 REPORT 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html)).  
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question that focused too expressly on secession: while traditional doctrine 
would indicate that there is no right to secede, it would also suggest that 
there is no prohibition either.74 Therefore Serbia would not want to frame 
this issue as a matter of secession, tempting the Court to declare the whole 
question purely political, subject to a non liquet.75 
Yet although traditional doctrine affects a Pilatean indifference to 
secession, in fact international law and relations have long been understood 
to be much more hostile to secession in practice.76 This is in part because of 
two related doctrines: territorial integrity and self-determination. 
The territorial integrity of states is a foundational principle of the 
postwar order, referred to in the U.N. Charter and ad nauseam in U.N. and 
other documents on almost any subject.77 Logically, if a state has a near-
 
 74.  See Thomas Burri, The Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing 
Links, 11 GERMAN L.J. 881, 884, 889 (2010). The other reason is more practically political: many 
powerful states with their own concerns about secessionist movements would not have liked such a 
question. See Hurst Hannum, The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned 
Chalice Refused?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 155, 158-59 (2011) [hereinafter Hannum, The Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo]. 
 75.  “[N]on liquet . . . [Latin “it is not clear”] . . . A tribunal's nondecision resulting from the 
unclarity of the law applicable to the dispute at hand. In modern usage, the phrase appears almost 
always in passages stating what a court must not do: tribunals are routinely disallowed from declaring a 
non liquet.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  See generally Alfredo Mordechai Rabell, Non 
Liquet: From Modern Law to Roman Law, 10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10-11 (2004); W. 
MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 569-75 (1971); Jason A. Beckett, Interim Legality: A Mistake 
Assumption?—An Analysis of Depleted Uranium Munitions under Contemporary International 
Humanitarian Law, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Thomas Burri, The Kosovo Opinion and 
Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links, 11 GERMAN L.J. 881 (2010). 
Whether or not Serbia was cautious in phrasing the question, it invoked the specter of secession 
in its lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Serbia Urges UN to Prevent Secessionist Moves, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 30, 2010), http://www.hindustantimes.com/Serbia-urges-UN-to-prevent-secessionist-
moves/Article1-579763.aspx (noting that Serbia invoked the possibility that a ruling favorable to 
Kosovo could encourage secessionist movements elsewhere, and that Kosovo denied this possibility). 
 76.  See, e.g., Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination and 
Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 555 (2010) (arguing “there should be no 
‘right’ to unilateral secession at all”); see generally Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination in Regional 
Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 60 (2011) (discussing current and 
historical secessionist movements); Ronald Thomas, The Distinct Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia: 
Deciding the Question of independence on the Merits and International Law, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1990 (2009) (discussing post-WWII political borders and ethnic groups’ struggle for independence).  
 77.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. DAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 
1970). See also U.N. Secretary-General, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the 
Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for 
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1320 (Dec. 1, 1978) [hereinafter Further Promotion]; Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and 
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absolute right to territorial integrity, it should also enjoy a near-absolute 
protection against threats to that integrity, including threats from 
disaffected internal elements.78 And, indeed, it traditionally does. The U.N. 
Charter framework both entrenches this protection and defines some limits 
to it, such as the power of the Security Council to order military 
intervention and the right of states to defend themselves.79 Recent 
developments have eroded the original pristine doctrine of territorial 
integrity: the developing notion of a responsibility to protect, for example, 
indicates conditions under which other states might be authorized to 
intervene in a state that fails to meet certain standards of conduct, such as 
protecting its own citizens from harm.80 But, in the main, the concept of 
territorial integrity remains quite solid, especially when it concerns the 
permanent alteration of political sovereignty over a given territory instead 
of emergency interventions.81 Indeed, the international administration and 
 
Mutual Assistance, July 6, 1961, N. Kor.-U.S.S.R., 420 U.N.T.S. 6045; United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: 
Comments Received from Governments Pursuant to Commission Resolution 14 A (XXXIV), U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1298 ( Dec. 6,1978) [hereinafter Rights of Minorities]; Complaint by the Revolutionary 
Government of Cuba Regarding the Various Plans of Aggression and Acts of Intervention Being 
Executed by the Government of the United States of America Against the Republic of Cuba, G.A. Res. 
1616 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1616 (Apr. 21, 1961); Promotion of Stability of International Relations 
in the Far East, G.A. Res. 291 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/291 (Dec. 8, 1949). 
 78.  This view was advanced by certain states in the proceedings. See Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 80. 
For a discussion of the territorial integrity issue, see generally Olivier Corten, Territorial Integrity 
Narrowly Interpreted: Reasserting the Classical Inter-State Paradigm of International Law, 24 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 87 (2011). 
 79.  U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51. 
 80.  See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT xii-xiii (2001) (listing conditions for military intervention to protect human life); see also 
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) 
(acknowledging a responsibility to protect); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) 
(reaffirming the Responsibility to Protect); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). The Security Council’s recent authorization of 
intervention in Libya invoked a version of this doctrine. See S.C. Res. 1973, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 
(Mar. 17, 2011). Development of this document was spurred, in significant part, by the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo. See Srdjan Cvijic, Self-Determination as a Challenge to the Legitimacy of 
Humanitarian Interventions: The Case of Kosovo, 8 GERMAN L.J. 57, 69 (2007); Robert Muharremi, 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited, 33 REV. CENT. 
& E. EUR. L. 401, 434 (2008) (placing the Kosovo intervention in the context of the emerging 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine). 
 81.  For review of arguments critical of the responsibility to protect doctrine, see Jutta Brunnée & 
Stephen J. Toope, The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality?, 2 GLOBAL 
RESP. TO PROTECT 191, 199-200 (2010) (“Several states, including some Arab states, Cuba, Iran, 
Pakistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam, rejected the responsibility to protect as an unacceptable intrusion 
into state sovereignty. . . . The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of states expressed ‘its rejection of the 
so-called “right” of humanitarian intervention, which has no basis either in the UN Charter or in 
international law,’ observed ‘the similarities between the new expression “responsibility to protect” and 
“humanitarian intervention,”[’] and wished ‘to carefully study and consider further the expression 
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independence of Kosovo has provided the principal challenge to that 
persistent orthodoxy—which is to say, it is an exception to a rule.82 
The second doctrine, self-determination—likewise endlessly and 
reflexively invoked in U.N. documents83—has rendered the post-colonial 
world even more hostile to the idea of secession. Although often associated 
with its earlier Wilsonian version, which sought to redesign borders to fit 
political communities, postwar self-determination as a legal doctrine is 
exceptionally conservative of existing territorial units. Colonies have the 
right to independence (also known as “external self-determination”84), but 
independent states are largely protected against sub-division. As self-
determination is the collective right of a “people”—and a “people” 
conventionally means the population of an existing political unit—the idea 
 
“responsibility to protect” and its implications on the basis of the principles of non-interference and 
non-intervention as well as the respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty of States.’”); 
Hurst Hannum, The Responsibility to Protect: Paradigm or Pastiche?, 60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 135, 135 
(2009) (“The vagueness, hyperbole and neo-colonial undertones of R2P may have the unwelcome 
consequence of making it more, not less, difficult to reach consensus on criteria for humanitarian 
intervention in the future. . . . [I]t may make it even more difficult to promote and protect human rights, 
properly understood, if a clear distinction is not maintained between the moral-political aspirations of 
the responsibility to protect and the legally binding norms of international human rights law.”); Edward 
C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 10, 11 
(2009) (arguing that developed and developing nations have sovereignty concerns regarding R2P); 
Matthew Kalkman, Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow, 5 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. 
REV. 75, 75 (2009) (“[T]his legal duty does not include the right, responsibility, or duty to use force. 
Ultimately, the duty is a bow without an arrow, placing hollow obligations to protect on those with 
international legal personality.”); Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman 
Empire to the Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 1003 (2009) (“Many States were 
concerned at the potential expansion of international authority that might flow from the endorsement of 
the responsibility to protect concept, and sought to limit the scope of international protective authority 
with a narrow definition of the triggers to international jurisdiction.”). 
 82.  As we shall see, this is largely the tack adopted by Kosovo, the United States and their allies 
in this debate: that the changed status of Kosovo was sui generis, with no precedential effects that might 
make secession more possible in general. 
 83.  E.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; see also Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual 
Assistance, supra note 77, art. 4 (declaring a commitment to territorial integrity); Further Promotion, 
supra note 77, ¶ 15 (listing representatives’ desire to give more attention to issues of territorial 
sovereignty); Rights of Minorities, supra note 77; Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970); 
G.A. Res. 1616, supra note 77; G.A. Res. 291, supra note 77 (calling upon all States to respect China’s 
territorial and political integrity); Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, supra 
note 77, art. IV.  
 84.  See Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and 
the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 137-38 (2010) (describing the evolution of the 
doctrine that oppressed peoples have a right to remedial secession, a doctrine that began to be 
associated with colonial groups in the 1960s); see also Vita Gudelevičiūtė, Does the Principle of Self-
Determination Prevail Over the Principle of Territorial Integrity?, 2 INT’L J. BALTIC L. 48, 49 (2005) 
(including the right to secede in the doctrine of external self-determination). 
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that any group of human beings other than the total population of a state 
has the right to self-determination is almost definitionally unavailable.85 
Taking these two doctrines together, it seems secession is doctrinally 
constructed as a political act that does not concern international law. Of 
course, a state’s right to territorial integrity and self-determination does not 
apply against itself, so a state is free to divide itself according to its own 
internally legitimated processes.86 Because of the overweening respect and 
deference traditionally still accorded to states in their internal 
affairsinternational law treats secession as simply the kind of internal 
process outsiders can neither involve themselves in nor understand.87 
But it is one thing to leave a state’s internal processes to itself, quite 
another to choose which internal processes to acknowledge or support. 
International law is full of prohibitions against states’ interfering in each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.88 Such interference can take 
many forms, from military intervention to support for rebel groups. Many 
of the actions taken by Kosovo’s supporters since 1999 would surely 
qualify as interference, and therefore require some separation justification. 
Of particular importance in relation to the UDI were the many acts of 
recognition of independent Kosovo. The law governing recognition is quite 
thin—this too is largely a political matter89—but if there are any limits, 
they would appear where recognition can be construed as interference with 
another state’s territorial integrity. Secession may be political, but the 
question of what support states can give to secessionist entities is 
considerably harder. 
 
 85.  See Jan Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law, 
28 HUM. RTS. Q. 186, 197 (2006) (describing the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion that Quebec 
could not secede because self-determination must be exercised in the context of existing sovereign 
states). 
 86.  See Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of Departure: Acceptable and Unacceptable State 
Support for Demographic Transformation: The Lieberman Plan to Exchange Populated Territories in 
Cisjordan, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 221, 263-75 (2008) (discussing the logic of state division 
justified by internal political processes). 
 87.  On the complexities accompanying the conversion of internal boundaries into international 
frontiers, see generally Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New 
States, 90 AM. J. INT’L. L. 590 (1996). 
 88.  See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations, Braz.-Turkm., Apr. 3, 1996, 1930 U.N.T.S. 105 (citing territorial integrity as an inspiration 
for the treaty); Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States art. 3, Jan. 22, 1993, 1819 U.N.T.S. 
37 (recognizing certain principles underlying the Charter, including territorial integrity and self-
determination);Treaty on the Establishment of the Central American Parliament and Other Political 
Organs pmbl., concluded  Oct. 2, 1987, 1994 U.N.T.S. 172 (entered into force May 1, 1990) (citing the 
importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity of States). 
 89.  See, e.g., European Community, Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992). 
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As a consequence, whatever the ambiguity of a doctrine that neither 
commands nor prohibits secession, actually successful secessions outside 
the colonial context are relatively rare,90 and almost all instances of states’ 
recognizing a secessionist entity have had plausible doctrinal cover in that 
the division of the state was not unilateral but was voluntary or otherwise 
accepted by the metropolitan state.91 This cover was entirely unavailable in 
Kosovo, because Serbia has consistently declared Kosovo to be its 
sovereign territory.92 
These considerations influenced the kinds of questions Serbia could 
ask and the risks it ran, and there have been criticisms of Serbia’s choice. 
For if the question had been, say, “Does Kosovo have the right to secede?” 
“Do the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have the right to 
 
 90.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great 
Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 9, 10 n.28 (2009) (“Instances of secession outside of the colonial context since the Second 
World War include: Senegal (1960); Singapore (1965); Bangladesh (1971); Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia (1991); the eleven successor states of the USSR (1991); the five successor states of Yugoslavia 
(1990s); the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993); and Eritrea (1993). . . . However, [James] Crawford 
notes that in the cases of Senegal, Singapore, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, each was separated 
pursuant to separation agreements or operations of their domestic constitutions. Moreover, the USSR 
capitulated on the secession of the Baltic States . . . [and] no longer contested their departure. The 
successor states of the USSR and those of Yugoslavia were formed due to dissolution of the preexisting 
states, not secession.” (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
392-402 (2d ed. 2006))). 
 91.  See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 J. 
DEMOCRACY 5, 13 (2003) (noting that the cases of Eritrea and the Baltic states involved mutual 
consent, while Bangladesh “was best viewed not as an exemplar of a recognized right to secede but 
‘rather as a fait accompli achieved as a result of foreign military assistance in special circumstances.’” 
(quoting James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession, 1998 BRITISH 
Y.B. INT’L L. 85, 115 (1999)); Timothy George McLellan, Kosovo, Abkhazia, and the Consequences of 
State Recognition, 5 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2009) (“The failure of Bangladesh to 
obtain UN membership prior to receiving Pakistani consent for secession sheds some doubt on whether 
or not its secession should be considered to be unilateral. . . . Croatia’s secession, like Bangladesh’s, 
satisfied all of the hypothetical criteria for remedial secession. Nonetheless, the circumstances 
assimilating Croatia with these criteria were purely incidental to its successful secession.”); Benjamin 
Perrin, Terrorism, Secession & Multinational Constitutions: The Challenge of Sri Lanka, 16 SRI LANKA 
J. INT’L L. 175, 197-98 (2004) (discussing the history of the Eritrean secession and the constitutional 
changes Ethiopia enacted in relation to that); Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples 
of Quebec Under International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 8-9 (2000) (“[T]he Canadian 
Constitution does not authorize the unilateral secession of any constituent region of the federation as 
did, for example, the constitutions of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia.”). Cf. China’s Anti-secession Law and Developments Across the Taiwan Strait: Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Asia & the Pacific of the H.R. Comm. On Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 7-8 
(2005) (discussing the “One China, two systems” model in the context of relations between Taiwan and 
China and expressing concern that Taiwan “is claimed as a sovereign territory by the People's Republic 
of China. . . . And this neighbor now threatens to annex Taiwan by force.”). 
 92.  See Hannum, The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 74, at 159 (analyzing the limited 
scope of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo given Serbia’s objections to Kosovar independence). 
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secede?” “Is there an affirmative right to secede in international law?” or 
even—turning from the action to the reaction—“May states recognize the 
independence of a secessionist territory that the sovereign has not itself 
recognized?” the Court would have been confronted with a more crisply 
defined question, one to which, under traditional readings of doctrine, there 
should be reasonably clear answers.93 Serbia would certainly have posed a 
more consequential—and politically sensitive—question to ask if other 
states were violating Serbia’s territorial integrity by recognizing Kosovo. 
However, the actual question did not ask anything about other states’ 
action, nor even if the secession or independence of Kosovo as such 
violated international law. The Court ultimately exploited this ambiguity. 
 Still, I must admit that in 2008, I did not think the question was so 
bad—I was more impressed with Serbia’s diplomatic skill in getting the 
question onto the General Assembly’s agenda and seemingly freezing a 
catalytic shift towards recognition. This view was fairly general, and at the 
time the mere fact of the referral was seen as a tactical victory for Serbia.94 
Whatever criticism we might lay on Serbia for asking such a defective 
question must be limited by two considerations. First, the question was not 
created in a vacuum of pure juridical. It had to be a question that the 
majority of the General Assembly would approve, and therefore was 
subject to a kind of anticipatory negotiation in which Serbia guessed at 
what formulation combined the highest likelihood of a positive final 
outcome and the highest likelihood of being approved in the first place.95 
Evidently, many states were willing to support the question that was 
framed, but they might not have agreed to a question that would have put 
the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination starkly on the line 
out of concern that the answer might erode sovereignty norms. After all, 
Kosovo was in fact independent and—whatever one thinks about the 
doctrinal framework or formulations that might have better favored 
 
 93.  Cf. id. at 158 (“To avoid any ambiguity, the question that the General Assembly should have 
put to the Court was: ‘Does the recognition by states of the juridical independence of Kosovo violate 
their obligations under international law not to interfere with the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Serbia?’”). 
 94.  See “Diplomatic Victory for Serbia,” B92.NET (Sept. 18, 2008, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm==09&dd=18&nav_id=53558 
(quoting Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, who characterized the opinion as an important component of 
Kosovo’s progress toward independence); Serbian Media Hail Victory at the UN, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 
10, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2008/10/10/2003425523 
(similarly characterizing the decision). There does not appear to have been any criticism of the 
question’s particular phrasing as such at the General Assembly at the time it was adopted. 
 95.  Cf. MICHLA POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE 
LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS 172-73, 221-76 (1971) [hereinafter POMERANCE, ADVISORY FUNCTION] 
(surveying “stillborn” attempts to put questions to the ICJ). 
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Serbia—the Court is rarely in the business of ruling against power.96 
Second, considering the Court’s extraordinary acrobatics—to which 
we will shortly turn—we might wonder if there is any question Serbia 
could have put that would not have been vulnerable to selective re-reading. 
The Court, like any judicial body, answers the question it wants to answer, 
not the one it is asked.97 Serbia was making a strategic attempt to steer 
between risks—between Scylla and a doctrinal swamp—but, as we shall 
see, the Court’s ultimate posture made all the steering seem pointless and 
misguided. Milanović’s question-question, therefore, is not really about the 
infelicity of the phrasing but the indeterminacy of the frame it presented the 
Court, and is therefore properly a question about what the Court chose to 
do with it.98 
What made most observers believe that the question was clear enough, 
despite its open wording, was that it appeared to present two substantive 
issues to the Court: self-determination or secession as a general matter, and 
the particular, quasi-constitutional arrangements in place in Kosovo. Put 
another way, the question was understood as asking if international law had 
anything to say about Kosovo’s independence. The question may have 
given the Court an opportunity to escape substance, but it also gave the 
Court the opportunity to engage substantively if it wished. As we shall see, 
the Court did not address either of the substantive questions; instead, its 
answer gave us the answer to a different question about the value of the 
Court itself. 
 
 96.  Cf. Hannum, The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 74, at 157-58 (“Judge Yusuf is 
correct when he observes that the restriction of the scope of the question . . . to whether international 
law prohibited the declaration of independence as such voids it of much of its substance.’ Nonetheless, 
it should come as no surprise that the Court decided not to take a stand on an issue that is both divisive 
and unclear, with major powers on each side.” (quoting Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, 2010 
I.C.J. 500, ¶ 2 (July 22), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/16005.pdf  [hereinafter 
Yusuf Separate Opinion])). 
 97.  Cf. ALJAGHOUB, supra note 70, at 57 (“The Court’s consistent practice illustrates that it has 
always been able to answer questions placed before it, even if there were intermixed with political and 
factual issues or even if the drafting of the request was unclear.”). 
 98.  Cf. Milanović, Kosovo Advisory Opinion Preview, supra note 71 (discussing the likely 
outcome and “disput[ing] the conventional wisdom that the Court will render a Solomonic opinion that 
will be equally (un)satisfactory for both sides. The formulation of the question and the consequent array 
of arguments appear to exclude such an option.” As it happened, the option Milanovic considered least 
likely (apart from outright dismissal) was closest to the Court’s chosen outcome: “Narrow reading: The 
Court can read the question very narrowly, in which case its answer will be very narrow as well, 
confined to the formal examination of the UDI as a purely verbal act adopted by a non-state actor on a 
given day. Whatever the Court’s decision, it will legally be neither here nor there with respect to the 
broader issues at play.”). 
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III. STRUCTURING THE OPINION: THE USES OF JURISDICTION 
But to arrive at that conclusion, we must first be clear on the structure 
of the Opinion, not simply to orient ourselves in some general fashion, but 
because the Opinion’s much-observed lack of substance is a function of its 
assiduous attention to and cultivation of procedural matters and 
institutional interests. The dense procedurality of the text is not merely 
lawyerly habit, but part of the Court’s strategy to achieve something else 
altogether: the entrenchment and expansion of its own authority. 
The Opinion opens, and continues at length, with a procedural 
review—nothing unusual in this, and indeed, anything else would have 
been99—and at just under a quarter of the way through the forty-five-page 
Opinion, we arrive at the question of jurisdiction.100 Jurisdiction is a 
procedural and sometimes dry matter, though often consequential, as it was 
here, in part because those who were wishing to make the question go away 
(at this stage, Kosovo and its allies) had reason to hope the Court might 
simply decline to take up the matter at all. A new section begins, but the 
layman or lawyer could well be forgiven for perceiving it as a continuation 
of the procedural history. Again, this is nothing unusual: a court, as an 
institution guided by rules (and gaining its legitimacy precisely because it 
follows those rules), must satisfy itself and its audience that it is competent 
to involve itself in a given matter.101 
Sometimes jurisdiction is a hard question, but not here, and it does not 
delay the Court too long. As we have seen, the Court’s power to issue 
advisory opinions on “any legal question” at the request of the General 
Assembly is clear102—those parties hoping the Court at this stage would 
 
 99.  Thus we have a helpful recitation of how the request first came to the Court’s attention, how 
it decided to structure the proceedings, what states submitted comments, how the Court distributed 
these to other states that did or didn’t submit comments, how it made the comments public, and who 
was heard for each party (including a long list of attorneys, some of whom are truly prominent and 
impressive figures). Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1-16. 
 100.  Id. ¶¶ 17-48. 
 101.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“[T]he Court 
cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot 
independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a 
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to 
determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794-95 (2005) (“It will therefore prove 
helpful to distinguish between the substantive legal legitimacy of judicial rulings, which reflects their 
correctness or reasonableness as a matter of law, and their authoritative legitimacy or legally binding 
character, which may depend on standards that allow a larger margin for judicial error.”); see generally 
John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy in relation to Bush v Gore). 
 102.  ICJ Statute, supra  note 41, art. 65(1). 
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find that it had no jurisdiction were predictably disappointed.103 Yet here 
we encounter the first moment in the Opinion that combines confusion and 
recognition: the Court notes that it “has sometimes in the past given certain 
indications as to the relationship between the question which is the subject 
of a request for an advisory opinion and the activities of the General 
Assembly.”104 
What is happening soon becomes clear. “[I]t was suggested,” the 
Court notes, that the Security Council’s involvement in the Kosovo matter, 
as an issue of international peace and security under Chapter VII, 
effectively prevented the General Assembly from taking up the question, 
and thus also from referring it to the Court.105 The Court pushes past this, 
artfully parsing the textual limitation that the Assembly shall make no 
“recommendation” while the Security Council is seized of a matter and 
concluding that an advisory opinion is not a recommendation.106 The 
immediate effect is to allow the Court to continue to deal with the General 
Assembly’s request. More broadly, of course, the Court has asserted its 
 
 103.  See Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 48 (“Accordingly, the Court considers that there are no 
compelling reasons for it to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in respect of the present request.”). 
 104.  Id. ¶ 21 (citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
Advisory Opinion (First Phase), 1950 I.C.J. 65, 70 (Mar. 30); Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 11-12 (July 8); Legal Consequences of Construction 
of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 16-17 (July 9)). 
 105.  Id. ¶ 24. The suggestion comes from the written contributions and comments of some of the 
intervening parties—those favoring the Kosovar position. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law 
of Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, 
Written Statement by the French Republic, ¶¶ 1.6, 1.28-1.42, (Apr. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15607.pdf; Accordance with International Law of Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Written 
Statement by the Republic of Kosovo, 130-36, (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf; Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, Written Statement by the 
United States of America, 41-45, (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf. The argument largely rests on the preemption of the General 
Assembly by the Security Council. See U.N. Charter art. 12, para. 1 (“While the Security Council is 
exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the 
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless 
the Security Council so requests.”). See also Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 22-23. The Security Council 
never made any such request to the Assembly—with Russia and China wielding vetoes, it would have 
been surprising if it had. 
 106.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 25 (“As the Court has stated on an earlier occasion, however, “[a] 
request for an advisory opinion is not in itself a ‘recommendation’ by the General Assembly ‘with 
regard to [a] dispute or situation’” (citing Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J., ¶ 25). In its next section, the Court also invokes the General 
Assembly’s 1950 “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, 377A (V), which allows the General Assembly to 
propose measures relating to international peace and security in situations in which the Security Council 
fails to act. See id. ¶ 42. The “non-recommendation” logic and the logic of Uniting for Peace are 
probably incompatible, at least when the Security Council has taken some action on a matter. 
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authority to interpret its own jurisdiction and the questions that come 
before it. 
Similarly, the Court resists moves to characterize the question as 
political in nature, and therefore something the Court should not deal with. 
This claim, again advanced by supporters of Kosovo, was made principally 
on the grounds that because secession—or at least a declaration of 
independence—is a political act, it is governed by municipal, not 
international, law.107 The Court’s rejection of this view is decisive and 
uncompromising, particularly in its assertion of judicial power and of the 
Court’s decisional and institutional autonomy: 
 
Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to respond to the 
legal elements of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially 
judicial task, namely, in the present case, an assessment of an act by 
reference to international law. The Court has also made clear that, in 
determining the jurisdictional issue of whether it is confronted with a 
legal question, it is not concerned with the political nature of the motives 
which may have inspired the request or the political implications which 
its opinion might have[.]108 
 
Having established its jurisdictional capacity, the Court addresses its 
discretion in similarly assertive terms. Here, a second opportunity arose for 
those hoping the Court would say nothing at all, a hope briefly encouraged 
by the seemingly unpromising words that open the Court’s analysis: “The 
fact that the Court has jurisdiction does not mean, however, that it is 
obliged to exercise it . . . .”109 The Court may give advisory opinions, or it 
may not. 
Discretion allows a court to avoid hard and awkward questions. This 
may be true here, but even that sort of discretion serves an institutional 
purpose which is, potentially, bolder, and the Court says as much: “The 
discretion whether or not to respond to a request for an advisory opinion 
exists so as to protect the integrity of the Court’s judicial function and its 
nature as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations . . . .”110 In other 
 
 107.  See id. ¶¶ 25-26 (framing the issue and the political objection). 
 108.  Id. ¶ 27 (citing U.N. Charter art. 4; Conditions of Admission of State to Membership in 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 61 (May 28); Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 234, ¶ 13 (July 8)). 
 109.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 110.  Id. ¶ 29 (citing Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 29 
(July 23); Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, ¶ 24 (July 12); Application for Review of Judgement No. 
273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1982 I.C.J. 325, ¶ 22 (July 20); 
Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J., ¶¶ 44-45).  
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words, discretion is not just judicial cowardice; it is also a device for 
protecting judicial prerogatives, for protecting the authority and autonomy 
of the Court—any court—as an institution.111 
In any event, the Court does not make a habit of refusing Advisory 
Opinions. Indeed, it almost never has112 and it does not here. The Court’s 
own jurisprudence recommends that it should do so only if there are 
“compelling reasons[.]”113 Here, it does not find any, rejecting the possible 
reasons proffered by some of the states: the motives of the sponsoring state 
(Serbia),114 the lack of a clear purpose or “any useful legal effect[,]”115 or 
even the possibility that an opinion might produce “adverse political 
consequences.”116 In an analysis that exhibits the kind of strategic restraint 
best known from and most effectively deployed in Marbury v. Madison,117 
the ICJ shows how—precisely because it should not presume to substitute 
its political judgment for the General Assembly’s—it is and implicitly must 
be free to give its legal opinion, come what may.118 The logic would be 
identical for a binding judgment.119 
 
The Eastern Carelia opinion is from the ICJ’s predecessor court, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, with whose jurisprudence that of the ICJ forms continuity. ICJ Statute, supra note 41,arts. 
36(5), 37 (providing in Article 36(5) that acceptance of the PCIJ’s jurisdiction are deemed to give 
compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ, and providing in Article 37 that treaties referring issues to the PCIJ 
shall be referred to the ICJ). 
 111.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 127-33 (1962) (describing American courts’ incentives and strategies for 
using jurisdictional discretion to avoid conflict with the political branches). 
 112.  The Court has never exercised its own discretion to refuse a question or declared that the 
question posed was not legal in nature, although it refused one case, WHO Legality, on grounds that it 
lacked jurisdiction as the question put was ultra vires—a doctrinal distinction that, in itself, tells us little 
given that it was the Court itself that determined the matter. See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 70, at 52-56, 
66, 97. 
 113.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 30 (citing Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon 
Complaints Made against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 30, at 86 (Oct. 23) (“[T]here would 
appear to be no compelling reason why the Court should not lend its assistance in the solution of a 
problem confronting a specialized agency of the United Nations authorized to ask for an Advisory 
Opinion[.]”)); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 156 ¶ 44 (July 4) (“In accordance with its consistent jurisprudence, only 
‘compelling reasons’ should lead the Court to refuse its opinion.”).  
 114.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 32-33. 
 115.  Id. ¶ 34.  
 116.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 117.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); MARK TUSHNET, I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING 
OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES 1-15 (2008). 
 118.  See Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 35 (noting that “[a]s the Court stated in [Nuclear Weapons], in 
response to a submission that a reply from the Court might adversely affect disarmament negotiations, 
faced with contrary positions on this issue ‘there are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one 
assessment to another’” and citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, ¶ 17). 
 119.  Although it has never refused an advisory opinion request, the Court has declined or found it 
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One particular objection prompts extended discussion: the fact that the 
General Assembly and not the Security Council sent the request.120 For the 
states that raised this objection, this is, of course, simply a second bite at 
the jurisdictional apple: even if the General Assembly had the right to ask 
the question (because it was not technically a “recommendation”), the 
Court need not and should not answer it because doing so abets an intrusion 
on the prerogatives of the Security Council.121 Given where the Opinion is 
heading—the second substantive issue addresses whether the UDI violated 
the quasi-constitutional regime enacted by the Security Council—the 
extensive discussion by which the Court dismisses this objection 
principally serves to expansively define the Court’s own authority. 
The Security Council had been intensively involved in Kosovo for a 
decade, beginning with Resolution 1160 in March 1998,122 most 
prominently in Resolution 1244 creating (or approving) KFOR, UNMIK 
 
did not have jurisdiction over contentious cases, especially where third party interests were at issue 
(Monetary Gold, East Timor) or where its own prerogatives and independence were threatened (Gulf of 
Maine). See, e.g., Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). Preliminary Objections., 105 
AM. J. INT’L L. 747, 752 n.19 (2011) [hereinafter Szewczyk, Application of CERD] (quoting W. 
Michael Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 & n.7 (1969), 
as discussing “‘not infrequent[]’ cases when ‘the Court anticipated that a state was likely to impugn a 
judgment . . . [and] disseised itself of jurisdiction’”), On cases involving third party interests, see 
Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the 
International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399, 419-22 (1997); on the Court’s institutional 
interests, see P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of African 
Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, 7 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 159, 182 (1998) (discussing the 
dissents by Judges Morovozov and El-Khani concerning the Court’s eventual acceptance, in Gulf of 
Maine, of Canada and the United States’ proposed special agreement effectively stipulating the 
composition of the chamber). Even without explicitly declining jurisdiction, the Court can deploy 
various interpretative maneuvers to the same effect. See, e.g., Perez, supra, 410-15 (noting that “the ICJ 
has, in exercising its powers of review without invoking a distinct political question doctrine, abstained 
in ways that perform the same function,” and discussing, at 410-15, forms of abstention in Southwest 
Africa and East Timor); Thomas M. Franck & Peter Prows, The Role of Presumptions in International 
Tribunals, 4 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 197 (2005). 
 120.  Id. ¶¶ 36-48. 
 121.  Written Statement by the French Republic, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 
22), ¶¶ 1.6, 1.28-1.42 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15607.pdf; 
Written Statement of the United States of America, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), 41-45 
(Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf; Written Contribution of 
the Republic of Kosovo, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22),  130-36 (Apr. 17, 
2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf; Written Statement of the 
Government of the Republic of Albania, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), ¶55 
(Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15618.pdf. 
 122.  S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). 
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and the PISG after the war in 1999,123 as well as in many other actions 
through 2008. The Council also discussed the UDI, though it took no action 
concerning it.124 The General Assembly itself had taken many actions in 
relation to Kosovo, although at the time of the UDI, Kosovo was not an 
active agenda item;125 in fact, prior to the debate over the request for an 
opinion itself, only the Security Council had discussed the UDI.126 To 
objectors, this meant that the Security Council, not the General Assembly, 
was the proper U.N. organ to ask the question, and letting the General 
Assembly ask it—which inevitably required the Court to interpret 
Resolution 1244—meant the Assembly would, through the agency of the 
Court, be interfering with the Council’s authority.127 
The Court disagrees: First, repeating its view that the General 
Assembly has an interest in the matter alongside the Security Council, it 
interprets this joint interest to mean that there is no compelling reason for 
the Court to refuse the Assembly’s request.128 As for the concern that 
answering the Assembly’s question meant interpreting Resolution 1244, the 
Court simply notes that this is true and that it does this sort of thing all the 
time.129 
With that, the Court establishes that there are no legal objections to 
issuing an opinion, nor any compelling reason not to do so.130 And more 
than this: in arriving at these conclusions—in describing its own 
“jurisdiction and discretion”131—the Court has identified and reaffirmed its 
own considerable latitude to substantively frame the issues before it—to 
grasp the nettle presented to it, another of its choosing, or none at all. It will 
immediately go further. 
IV. AVOIDING SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. . . 
Having considered jurisdiction, the Court now turns to the question 
 
 123.  S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). The resolution served as the mandate 
for the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). For further information on 
KFOR and UNMIK see Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 37.  
 124.  The Opinion discusses these and other Security Council actions at paragraph 37. Id. ¶ 37. 
 125.  Id. ¶ 38. 
 126.  Id. ¶ 44; but see id. ¶ 45 (noting that the Assembly had discussed related issues). 
 127.  See id. ¶ 39 (summarizing these concerns). 
 128.  See id. ¶¶ 42-44. 
 129.  Id. ¶¶ 46-47 (citing both advisory opinions and judgments in contentious cases in which the 
Court interpreted one U.N. organ’s actions in a matter raised by another). 
 130.  A minority of judges—Bennouna, Keith, Koroma, Skotnikov, and Tomka—voted against 
exercising the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 131.  This is the heading for this section of the Opinion. Id. ¶¶ 17-48 (title at p. 13, immediately 
preceding ¶ 17). 
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itself, although its discussion remains both markedly procedural and 
strongly assertive of the Court’s prerogatives to read and answer the 
question as it wishes. In the section entitled “Scope and Meaning of the 
Question,” the Court 
 
recalls that in some previous cases it has departed from the language of 
the question put to it where the question was not adequately formulated 
. . . or where the Court determined, on the basis of its examination of the 
background to the request, that the request did not reflect the “legal 
questions really in issue” . . . .132 
 
In such cases, “the Court has clarified the question before giving its 
opinion.”133 This, arguably, is exactly what a court is supposed to do, 
perhaps especially in an advisory opinion.134 
Having asserted its power to read (and re-read) questions, the Court 
finds this question “clearly formulated” and “sees no reason to reformulate 
the scope of the question,”135 but then immediately does exactly that, 
identifying “two aspects of the question which require comment.”136 The 
first concerns the role and identity of the actors who made the UDI, and 
their relationship to the provisional administration created by the Security 
Council;137 the second concerns a proposed analogy between Kosovo and 
another case, in another court, dealing with self-determination—the 
 
 132.  Id. ¶ 50 (citations omitted) (quoting Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 
between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 89, ¶ 35). See also ALJAGHOUB, supra 
note 70, at 57 (“The Court observed that throughout its jurisprudence there had been cases where the 
wording of a request for an advisory opinion did not correspond to the ‘true legal question’ under 
consideration, or that ‘the question put to the Court was, on the face of it, at once infelicitously 
expressed and vague.’”) (quoting Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO 
and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 89, ¶¶ 34-36; and Application for Review of Judgement No. 
273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, 1982 I.C.J., ¶ 46, respectively). 
 133.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 50. The Opinion notes it has done this “where the question asked 
was unclear or vague” and where “the request did not reflect the ‘legal questions really in issue[.]’” Id. 
(citing Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion, 1982 I.C.J., ¶ 46). See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 70, at 57 (discussing the 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa Case, 1956 I.C.J., 25; 
and the Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J., 162, and noting that the Court itself has said that “it had often been 
required to broaden, interpret and even reformulate questions put to it.”). 
 134.  See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 70, at 60 (“The fact that the Court has a duty to clarify the law is 
paramount and should supersede other considerations. . . . Therefore, it can reformulate questions put to 
it in order to highlight the legal points contained with the question.”). 
 135.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 51 (“In the present case, the question posed by the General 
Assembly is clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific . . . .”). 
 136.  Id. ¶ 52. 
 137.  Id. ¶¶ 52-53.  
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Quebec Reference.138 Although the ICJ denies that it is doing anything 
other than glossing the question as it is, both of these “aspects” in fact 
present the Court with an opportunity to substantively redefine the 
question—an opportunity the Court denies it will take, and then does.139 
A. Deciding Not to Identify the Authors 
The first and, as it will turn out, key aspect is the Court’s reading of 
who exactly declared independence, and its analysis is framed—really, 
predetermined—by the procedural ground it has staked out for itself earlier 
in the Opinion. The Assembly’s question refers to a declaration made “by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo” with a similar 
reference in the preamble.140 This implicitly asserts a fact that one might 
contest—the identity of the declaration’s authors; indeed, several states 
favoring Kosovo’s position raised this very issue.141 
This is a substantive question—the identity of the authors could affect 
the outcome of the question142—but the Court embeds the matter in a claim 
about its institutional and interpretive prerogatives: “It would be 
incompatible with the proper exercise of the judicial function for the Court 
to treat that matter as having been determined by the General Assembly”143 
and is something on which, the Court asserts, “the General Assembly [did 
not] intend[] to restrict the Court’s freedom to determine this issue for 
itself.”144 This will prove decisive for the analysis of the relationship 
between the UDI and the administration established in Resolution 1244. 
Yet even before it turns to its own substantive evaluation of the 
 
 138.  Id. ¶¶ 55-56.   
 139.  Cf. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, 2010 I.C.J. 467, ¶ 3 (July 22), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15991.pdf [hereinafter Koroma Dissent] (“Although the Court in 
exercising its advisory jurisdiction is entitled to reformulate or interpret a question put to it, it is not free 
to replace the question asked of it with its own question and then proceed to answer that question, 
which is what the Court has done in this case, even though it states that it sees no reason to reformulate 
the question.”). 
 140.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 1; Request for Advisory Opinion, Introductory Note, (Oct. 10, 2008), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15022.pdf. 
 141.  See, e.g., Written Statement by the French Republic, Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 
(July 22),  ¶¶ 1.11, 1.12 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15607.pdf; Written 
Statement of the United States of America, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), n.231 
and accompanying text (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf.  
 142.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 52, 102-09.  
 143.  Id. ¶ 52. 
 144.  Id. ¶ 53 (developing an argument about the Assembly’s intent based on the absence any 
reference to the authors in the agenda item or in the title of the resolution that contained the question). 
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authors’ identity—in the run-up to issuing the Opinion—the Court also 
executed a procedural maneuver passim that both indicated and structured 
the Opinion’s ultimate conclusions: the Court decided to invite “the authors 
of the above declaration” to submit comments.145 In the event, however, 
comments were submitted by the Republic of Kosovo, whose own 
recitation of the Court’s offer can certainly be read—as it was likely 
written—with an ironic smile,146 given what, in the end, the Court 
concluded about the identity of the UDI authors. For this early procedural 
move is the only point at which the Court equates the authors with the state, 
and that is curious, however one understands their relationship: either “the 
authors” are not a subject of international law and therefore cannot speak—
a view that is canonical147—or they actually or in effect are a state, in 
which case it would be strange to pretend the Opinion has nothing to do 
with secession or Kosovo’s status. The best one can do is be open and 
transparent about the effect of identifying the authors in this way, and that 
the Court is not. 
B. Declining to Expand the Question 
Second, the Court notes and swiftly dismisses another proposal—this 
time from the supporters of Serbia—to frame its analysis in broader terms 
similar to those used in the Quebec Reference, decided by the Supreme 
Court of Canada.148 We will return to this case, here noting only that in 
response to the question originally put to it, the Quebec Court adopted a 
 
 145.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 146.  “The Republic of Kosovo is grateful to the Court for this invitation, which enables it to 
participate in the proceedings on an equal footing.” Written Contribution of the Republic of Kosovo, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), ¶ 1.05 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf. 
 147.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Part II Persons in International Law, 
Introductory Note (1987) (“The principal persons under international law are states. . . . States have 
capacity to make international law, largely by practice that forms customary law and by international 
agreement. . . . States have legal personality and rights and duties under international law.”). 
 148.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 55. See also Written Contribution by the Republic of Kosovo, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22),  130-36 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15678.pdf (discussing the power of the Court to respond to the question and the 
need to take the context of the declaration of independence into account); Statement of the Government 
of Ireland, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), ¶¶ 21-22 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15662.pdf; Written Statement of the People’s Republic of China, Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22),  ¶ II(c) (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15611.pdf (discussing courts reaffirming the principle of respect for state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity). 
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more general formulation, similar to some of those which might have been 
more probative of the substantive issues than the actual question Serbia 
posed.149 The Court correctly notes that the Kosovo question is, on its own 
terms, narrower, “does not ask about the legal consequences of [the UDI] . . 
. [nor] whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood,”150 and does not 
expressly mention secession,151 and so: 
 
[t]he Court is not required by the question it has been asked to take a 
position on whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on 
Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether 
international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated 
within a State unilaterally to break away from it. Indeed, it is entirely 
possible for a particular act—such as a unilateral declaration of 
independence—not to be in violation of international law without 
necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it. The Court 
has been asked for an opinion on the first point, not the second.152 
 
Having so recently noted its power to revise questions (and having 
already commented on two aspects of the question), the Court energetically 
declines to do so, the effect of which we shall now consider. 
V.  . . . AND MAKING SUBSTANTIVE MOVES, LIKE 
AFTERTHOUGHTS 
Having adopted almost as leisurely a pace as this Article, the Opinion 
is nearly half done—21 of its 45 pages, 56 of its 123 paragraphs—by the 
time it reaches what are usually, and here perhaps generously, known as 
“the merits of the case.”153 As is often the case in legal proceedings, by this 
point, the answer is all but assured. 
The Court identifies two major concerns: one “concerning the 
lawfulness of declarations of independence under general international law, 
against the background of which . . . Security Council resolution 1244 
(1999) is to be understood and applied” and another about “the legal 
 
 149.  See supra discussion accompanying note 30.  
 150.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 51 (“Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the 
recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State.”). 
 151.  Id. ¶ 56 (“The question put to the Supreme Court of Canada inquired whether there was a 
right to ‘effect secession’, and whether there was a rule of international law which conferred a positive 
entitlement on any of the organs named. By contrast, the General Assembly has asked whether the 
declaration of independence was ‘in accordance with’ international law.”). 
 152.  Id. ¶ 56. 
 153.  Actually, the Court itself identifies the moment of substance as arriving even later, at 
paragraph 78, since the intervening paragraphs are a summary of the factual background of the UNMIK 
administration period and the events surrounding the UDI. Id. ¶¶ 57-77. 
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relevance of . . . 1244 . . . [and] whether the resolution creates special rules 
. . . applicable to the issues raised by the . . . declaration.”154 The first 
question asks if general international law says anything about declarations 
of independence; the other asks if the specific rules created for Kosovo 
affect the outcome. As we shall see, the Court’s analysis quickly disposes 
of these questions, and where it lingers, it is to a very different purpose—to 
ensure the question is further, fully emptied of content and of any potential 
to offend the Security Council or threaten the institutional position of the 
Court. 
A. General International Law—Reaching an Inevitable Conclusion, 
Quickly 
We have already seen that the rules of general international law 
relating to secession are formally indeterminate—almost agnostic—even 
though in practice the field is actually more dogmatically inclined. The 
Court does not actually address secession, since it has already announced 
that is not a question it has been asked; rather, it notes, quite accurately, 
that there is no prohibition against declarations of independence as such:  
 
In no case, however, does the practice of States as a whole suggest that 
the act of promulgating the declaration was regarded as contrary to 
international law. On the contrary, State practice during this period 
points clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no 
prohibition of declarations of independence.155 
 
And that is about it—one can almost see the analysis grinding to a 
halt—since, really, what more is there going to be to say, if that is the 
question? 
There are few mopping-up operations, mostly further limiting the 
inquiry’s scope: some states had objected that territorial integrity implies a 
prohibition on secession or declarations of independence—or at least 
prohibited their having any effect—while others objected that territorial 
 
 154.  Id. ¶ 78. 
 155.  Id. ¶ 79 (further noting that state practice under postwar self-determination and decolonization 
likewise “does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a 
declaration of independence. . . .”). The Court’s view that in the absence of prohibition the UDI is not 
“in violation of” and therefore “in accordance with” international law is an implicit restatement of the 
freedom principle from Lotus—something commentators have observed but which, interestingly, the 
Court itself does not mention. See e.g., Anne Peters, Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?, 
24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 95 (2011) [hereinafter Peters, Lotus-Land]; see also Hannum, The Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 74, at 155-56.  See also SS Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser.A) No. 10, at 18-19. 
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norms prevented other states from recognizing such actions.156 Addressing 
these objections together, the Court holds that “the scope of the principle of 
territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States.”157 
In other words, the question of a declaration of independence’s effect, or 
the legality of other states’ recognizing a secessionist entity on another 
state’s territory, are very much issues—but not ones this Court will be 
addressing.158 
Self-determination likewise is declared outside the scope of inquiry. 
Several states had advanced a secondary claim that Kosovo had a right to 
self-determination on a remedial theory (that is, in response to the 
depredations of Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s),159 but the Court “considers 
 
 156.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 80.  Compare Written Statement of the Republic of Argentina ¶ 74, 
Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J. (April 17), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15666.pdf (“It 
emerges from State practice that three main elements constitute the core of the notion of territorial 
integrity: first, the notion of plenitude. . . . Second, the notion of inviolability. . . . Third, the guarantee 
against any dismemberment of the territory. That explains, for instance, that the support of secessionist 
movements is considered a violation of the territorial integrity of the State concerned.”), and Written 
Statement by Brazil, Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J. (April 17), at 2, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15660.pdf (“the Unilateral Declaration of Independence contradicts relevant 
provisions of the international law, in particular the principle of territorial integrity of sovereign and 
independent States”), and Written Statement of the People’s Republic of  China to the International 
Court of Justice on the Issue of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J.(April 17), at III(c), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15611.pdf (“In the exercise of the right to self-determination, the 
territorial integrity of a sovereign State should be respected rather than undermined.”) and Written 
Statement submitted by the Republic of Cyprus, Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J. (April 17), ¶87 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15609.pdf (“States are now under a positive legal obligation not 
to recognize States created by, or territorial title gained by, the use of force,”); with Written Statement 
by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J. (April 17), ¶4, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15676.pdf (“The recognition of Kosovo contravenes the rules of the 
International Law, set forth in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), since such action threatens 
the principle of not breaching or undervaluing the territorial integrity of the sovereign States”). 
 157.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 80; see also id., ¶¶ 80-1 (discussing several specific Security Council 
resolutions condemning particular declarations of independence but finding that they are specific to 
their circumstances and do not contribute to a general norm); Tarcisio Gazzini, The Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion from the Standpoint of General International Law, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/Gazzini_Kosovo_Note_EN.pdf. 
 158.  A number of states directly argued that territorial integrity as a principle also binds non-state 
actors. Anne Peters, comments during panel at American Society for International Law annual 
conference, March 2011.  See also Written Statement of the Government of  the Republic of Serbia, 
Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J.(April 17), ¶ 431, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf; 
Written Comments of the Argentine Republic, Advisory Opinion, 2009 I.C.J. (July 17), ¶¶ 38-41 , 
http://www3.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15688.pdf.  Why exactly states were concerned about the 
responsibility of non-state actors—and why the Court was concerned to avoid it—we shall shortly see. 
 159.  Written Statement by the Republic of Albania, Advisory Opinion, 38-54 (Apr. 17, 2009), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15618.pdf; Written Statement by the Republic of Latvia, 
Advisory Opinion, ¶1-4 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15656.pdf; Written 
Statement by the Republic of Poland, Advisory Opinion, ¶¶ 6.1-6.6 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15632.pdf. 
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that it is not necessary to resolve these questions in the present case.”160 As 
we have seen, the key turn the Court made was to cast the General 
Assembly’s question as a specific one, an evaluation of this declaration in 
its circumstances, rather than as a general issue of law of the kind 
considered in Quebec. Yet, although the Court’s framing indeed narrows 
the issue, its effect is the opposite of a detailed analysis—it strips out the 
specific details of this series of events. The Court chooses to analyze the 
literal act of declaring independence—not its effect, nor the reactions of 
other states, nor the causes that might have justified the act—in splendid 
procedural isolation.161 The purpose is clear: to avoid answering any of the 
questions that—in the views of the participating actors—really mattered. 
B. The Specific Law for Kosovo: Removing the Last Element of Substance 
The general international law analysis is over almost before it started; 
indeed, given the way the Court had framed the question, it effectively was. 
Analysis of specific international obligations concerning the regime put in 
place by the Security Council under Resolution 1244 carries on 
considerably longer, but still shows a similarly clear purpose to avoid. 
Indeed, the Court’s crowning achievement—by which it simultaneously 
avoided offense to the Security Council and vacated the original question 
of all substance—only appears through its artful analysis of Kosovo’s 
internal institutions and the identity of the UDI’s authors. 
As the Court had already noted, the identity of the UDI’s authors was 
consequential, and it was politically sensitive. The problem, which the 
Court accurately perceived, was the possibility that even if there was no 
general prohibition on declaring independence, the particular authors of the 
UDI might have been specially disabled from doing so. The General 
Assembly’s question, recall, identified the authors of the UDI as the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), formed under the 
authority of Resolution 1244; if any part of the PISG, such as the Assembly 
of Kosovo, had issued the UDI, that might have been an ultra vires 
 
 160.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 83. The Court notes that “almost all” participants agreed that 
remedial self-determination was “beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly[,]”; 
id. ¶ 83, although “[a] number of participants” had advanced the argument, id. ¶ 82. 
 161.  Cf. Qerim Qerimi, University of Prishtina and Harvard Law School, What the Kosovo 
Opinion Means for the Rest of the World, Panel Discussion at American Society for International Law 
annual conference (Mar. 2011) (noting that a search for justice, broadly defined, would imply looking at 
other Charter provisions regarding humanitarian goals, self-determination and human rights). Where the 
Court avoids the question of territorial integrity by reserving that to the behavior of states, Koroma 
would have found that “international law upholds the territorial integrity of a State,” Koroma Dissent, 
supra note 139, ¶ 21, and expressly gave priority to sovereignty and territorial integrity over claims of 
self-determination, id. ¶ 22, a question the majority avoided. 
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action—illegal, not because of any general prohibition, but because of 
specific limits on the PISG’s power. The Security Council would have been 
very displeased to discover that institutions it created for the specific 
purpose of temporarily governing a territory while the Security Council 
looked for a permanent solution were empowered to effect their own 
solution. 
The question was clearly sensitive, yet—on its face—the Court 
seemed boldly prepared to address it. Acknowledging that the 1244 regime 
and Constitutional Framework “form part of the international law which is 
to be considered in replying to the question,”162 the Court asserts that it can 
“analyse statements by representatives of members of the Security Council 
made at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council 
on the same issue, as well as the subsequent practice of relevant United 
Nations organs and of States affected by those given resolutions.”163 In 
other words, the Court has considerable latitude to define its own inquiry. 
This reiterates what the Court has said about its freedom to interpret the 
General Assembly’s question even if that touches actions of the Security 
Council; procedural assertions continue to pile up, even as the Opinion 
nears its end. But the use to which this interpretive boldness is put is 
striking for how it combines assertiveness with avoidance. 
The Court’s analysis of the UDI’s accordance with the lex specialis—
the special legal regime established for Kosovo by the Security Council—
adopts two lines of inquiry: first, what the authors’ real identity is, and 
second, if the textual frame of 1244 prohibits them from issuing a 
declaration. As the Court opens this final substantive question, it 
immediately recalls its own procedural agnosticism about who the authors 
were. For, although it might be a problem if a juridical creature of the 
Security Council declared independence, it might not be if, as the Court 
helpfully and anticipatorily suggests, “those who adopted the declaration 
were acting in a different capacity.”164 
And so, as it turns out, they were: the UDI was not an “Act of the 
Assembly of Kosovo”; rather, it was the product of private citizens who 
also happened to be members of the Assembly (and other parts of PISG): 
 
[T]aking all factors together, the authors of the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 did not act as one of the Provisional 
 
 162.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 93; see also id. ¶ 91; see generally, id. ¶¶ 85-93 (laying out the 
reasons why the 1244 regimes and Constitutional Framework were still in force and constituted part of 
international law for the question’s purposes). 
 163.  Id. ¶ 94. 
 164.  Id. ¶ 102. 
WATERS FINAL VERSION 3(DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013  11:09 AM 
2013] MISPLACED BOLDNESS: SUBSTANCE IN THE ICJ’S KOSOVO OPINION 309 
Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, 
but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as 
representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the 
interim administration.165 
Now, the claim that these officials were acting in a parallel personal 
capacity struck many observers and intervening parties (and dissenting 
judges)166 as attenuated; they considered it obvious that these were PISG 
institutions acting, a conclusion that for most logically meant the UDI was 
ultra vires.167 But the textual record of the UDI’s passage is complex and 
ambiguous,168 and the Court’s interpretation of the 1244 regime and final 
 
 165.  Id. ¶ 109; see also id. ¶ 105 (“The declaration of independence, therefore, was not intended by 
those who adopted it to take effect within the legal order created for the interim phase, nor was it 
capable of doing so. On the contrary, the Court considers that the authors of that declaration did not act, 
or intend to act, in the capacity of an institution created by and empowered to act within that legal order 
but, rather, set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of which would lie outside that 
order.”). The Court also specifically addresses the relationship of the UDI to the Constitutional 
Framework: “It follows that the authors of the declaration of independence were not bound by the 
framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government. Accordingly, the Court finds that the declaration of independence did 
not violate the Constitutional Framework.” Id. ¶ 120. 
 166.  See, e.g., Opinion, Declaration of Vice-President Tomka, 2010 I.C.J. 454 (July 22)  ¶¶ 11-12 
[hereinafter Tomka Declaration] (criticizing the majority’s view, at paragraph 109 of the Opinion, that 
the UDI was issued by private actors: “This conclusion has no sound basis in the facts relating to the 
adoption of the declaration, and is nothing more than a post hoc intellectual construct. The majority’s 
conclusion implies that all relevant actors did not know correctly who adopted the declaration on 17 
February 2008 in Pristina: Serbia, when it proposed the question; other States which were present in the 
General Assembly when it adopted resolution 63/3; the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his 
Special Representative; and, most importantly, the Prime Minister of Kosovo when he introduced the 
text of declaration at the special session of the Assembly of Kosovo!”). 
 167.  For an example of a different conclusion, see Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Lawfulness of Kosovo’s 
Declaration of Independence, 14 ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.asil.org/files/insight100817pdf.pdf [hereinafter Szewczyk, Lawfulness] (arguing the Court 
could have acknowledged the PISG’s authorship of the UDI but still found that consistent with the 
PISG’s role under 1244).  
 168.  The UDI was signed by 109 members of the 120-member Assembly of Kosovo, as well as the 
President of Kosovo. Id. ¶¶ 76, 107. (The Serb and Gorani members did not sign.) The UDI declares 
that its authors had “[c]onvened in an extraordinary meeting on February 17, 2008, in Pristina, the 
capital of Kosovo[,]” but did not actually identify what, if any, institution was convening. UDI, first 
preambular paragraph, in id. ¶ 74. In its operative part, the UDI says “We, the democratically-elected 
leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state.” (UDI ¶ 1 
(operative part), in id. ¶ 75). In opening the meeting at which the UDI was approved, the President and 
Prime Minister made reference to the Assembly of Kosovo as the body acting, id. ¶ 104, but  
[n]owhere in the original Albanian text of the declaration (which is the sole authentic 
text) is any reference made to the declaration being the work of the Assembly of Kosovo. 
. . . The language used in the declaration differs from that employed in acts of the 
Assembly of Kosovo in that the first paragraph commences with the phrase “We, the 
democratically-elected leaders of our people . . .”, whereas acts of the Assembly of 
Kosovo employ the third person singular. 
The procedure for adopting the UDI also differed from the Assembly’s usual practice, including being 
signed by the President. Id. ¶ 107. But see Tomka Declaration, supra note 166, ¶ 20 (noting that the 
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status process, while discretionary and extremely formalistic, is plausible: 
It seems quite clear that the 1244 framework was intended to be open, 
flexible and agnostic about the final status.169 Moreover, it is a view that 
indirectly brings the Court’s analysis as close as it will come to a 
substantively consequential question. 
The problem lies not with the chosen interpretation but with the way 
the Court uses its interpretation to terminate the analysis at the precise 
point that, really, one would have expected it to begin. The Court’s 
seemingly decisive conclusion—that these individuals were not acting in 
their official capacity—is bludgeoningly trite: the very point of secession is 
to alter the existing political order, and it inheres in the concept of 
unilateral secession that those seceding neither act within nor feel 
constrained by that order.170 Even more, it means that when a unilateral 
secession occurs, the logical and necessary response is a substantive 
analysis of its correctness as a general matter, or of its correctness in the 
 
signatories were “‘invite[d]’ to sign [the UDI] in his/her capacity of either ‘the member of Kosovo 
Assembly’ or ‘the member of Chairmanship’ of the Assembly”  (quoting Transcript of the Special 
Plenary Session of the Assembly of Kosovo on the Declaration of Independence (Feb. 17, 2008), 
reprinted in Written Contribution of the Republic of Kosovo annex 2, at 239-45 (Apr. 17, 2009))). In 
Szewczyk, Lawfulness, supra note  167, n.23, the author notes that “[t]he authentic Albanian text of the 
[UDI] reads ‘Deputetët e Kuvendit të Kosovës,’ meaning ‘Deputies of the Kosovo Assembly.’”  
 169.  The Court notes divergent views on this question: States supporting Serbia argued that the 
framework put in place by the Security Council was intended as the only one available until the Council 
(and perhaps also the parties to the dispute) approved a different arrangement; On this reading, 
secession and the establishment of a new state, regardless of who created it, would contravene that 
framework. Id. ¶ 111.  Kosovo’s supporters argued that the UDI was consistent with a permanent 
solution, in part because the Security Council had not expressly precluded independence and had 
indirectly incorporated into 1244 a reference in the Rambouillet Accords to a final settlement being 
based on “the will of the people.” Id. ¶ 112. The Court favors the latter view—it notes that the “specific 
contours, let alone the outcome, of the final status process were left open by . . .1244.” Opinion, supra 
note 3, ¶ 104—and adduces further evidence from a resolution on Cyprus, passed just 19 days after 
1244, that expressly provides for final settlement to include a unified state, while, “[b]y contrast, under 
the terms of resolution 1244 (1999) the Security Council did not reserve for itself the final 
determination of the situation in Kosovo and remained silent on the conditions for the final status of 
Kosovo. Resolution 1244 (1999) thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of 
independence.” Id. ¶ 114. 
 170.  On the Court’s logic, only secessionists who act within a political order would be subject to it. 
Some states do allow secession of identified sub-units. Christopher J. Borgen, Language of Law and the 
Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and 
South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 10, n.28 (2009) (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (“[I]n the cases of Senegal, Singapore, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia, each was separated pursuant to separation agreements or operations of their domestic 
constitutions.”). In such cases, it is possible to analyze secession as a function of the existing legal 
order—but unilateral secession, by definition, only occurs when there is no accepted provision for it. 
This was clearly the case here—Serbia adamantly opposed secession and considered it a violation both 
of international law and of its own municipal legal order; the UDI’s authors—who after all called their 
declaration “unilateral”—knew this. 
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particular circumstances, or of its relevance to other actors’ responses. 
Instead, the Court uses the fact that the authors are necessarily acting 
outside or violating the existing legal order as a reason to conclude there is 
nothing further to analyze. 
For, having identified the authors as private citizens not subject to a 
specific textual prohibition, the Court finally administers the coup de 
grâce. The general and specific international law applied in Kosovo says 
nothing about what individuals choose to do in the name of the nation.171 
Here the reasons for the Court’s early insistence that the issue before it 
involves states, not non-state actors, becomes clear: Perhaps an organ of the 
U.N. could not declare independence, perhaps other states could not 
recognize such a declaration, but these are not at issue. Perhaps, too, the 
Security Council could have expressly precluded private actors from 
declaring independence, but it did not, and nothing more than mere private 
action had happened here—at least, the Court would not discuss anything 
more. 
The narrowness of the finding is totalizing: we cannot even speak of 
 
 171.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 121 (“The Court has already held, however . . . that the declaration 
of independence of 17 February 2008 was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in 
which those Provisional Institutions operated. It follows that the authors of the declaration of 
independence were not bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern 
the conduct of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 
declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework.”). The Court has already 
noted that there “is no indication, in the text of [1244], that the Security Council intended to impose . . . 
a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting, addressed to such other [non-official] actors.” 
Id. ¶ 115 (and contrasting, at paragraph 116, Resolution 1244’s silence with earlier resolutions that had 
expressly directed themselves to non-official actors, including “the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian 
community” mentioned in Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), ¶ 4). The issue, therefore, as the 
Court considers it, concerns not only the authors’ official capacity, but also the permissive governing 
framework the Court identifies. See supra Part V.A. From this context—which includes the patent 
failure of efforts to determine a final status—the Court concludes that the authors did not act in their 
formal capacities as members of the PISG, and did not intend the UDI to have effect within that legal 
order, but outside of it. Id. ¶¶ 102-06. 
One might argue that the absence of references to local leaders in 1244, when previously they 
had been mentioned, was due to the Security Council’s assumption that the “leadership” would now be 
represented by the PISG, and therefore silence was not permission but presumptive exclusion. But this 
is an interpretative choice, and while we might criticize the Court for not acknowledging the ambiguity 
of its evidence, we cannot do more than simply agree or disagree with its conclusion. One thing, 
though, we might say: Such references in early resolutions show that there was a leadership—which 
might make us wonder less about the Court’s interpretation of whom the Security Council resolutions 
was addressing, and more about its own failure to ask what consequential authority those 
representatives had, or ought to have, in international law, beyond a Lotus-like vacuity of bare 
permissiveness. For a discussion of this section of the Opinion, see Marcelo G. Kohen & Katherine Del 
Mar, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion and UNSCR 1244 (1999): A Declaration of ‘Independence from 
International Law’?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L 109 (2011). On the relationship of the Opinion to the Lotus 
principle, see Peters, Lotus-Land, supra note 155. 
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“this kind of act” because the Court’s analysis is so specific that it really 
refers only to this act, in its own hyper-specific context of Kosovo under 
the 1244 regime.172 This particular act, by private citizens, is simply not 
governed by international law, and therefore cannot violate the law, and 
therefore is “in accordance with” international law: QED. 
What this suggests is that the Court is following but misreading the 
classical doctrinal implications of legal subjectivity: that is, the Court 
considers the authors to be actors without international legal personality, 
but then ignores the very old distinction that, from an international legal 
perspective, acts by such actors are void—they are legal non-actions. 
Calling the UDI void would have been quite different from saying it “did 
not violate international law”—and still would have allowed the Court to 
reach a variety of conclusions about all other aspects of the case, such as 
states’ recognition of Kosovo. Either its authors are individuals in the 
classic, geschäftsunfähig sense—in which case voidness is a better frame 
for understanding their actions than “accordance with the law”—or they are 
capable actors in their own right, in which case the Court ought to analyze 
their actions as the legally consequential events they seem to have been.173 
The Court is evidently uncomfortable with the thought that individuals 
or organs acting under the authority of the Security Council might declare 
independence, and the Opinion largely aims at showing that this wasn’t 
happening. But on the Court’s own analysis, it wouldn’t have mattered if 
 
 172.  As the Court is at pains to note, its analysis of the PISG’s scope of action, based on its close 
reading 1244, does not say anything about other situations: “[T]he Court observes that the 
Constitutional Framework functions as part of a specific legal order, created pursuant to resolution 1244 
(1999), which is applicable only in Kosovo. . . .” Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 89. 
 173.  Cf. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 164-66 (1971). It would be interesting to consider what the 
Court would have found if the same actors had, say declared war against Serbia and crossed the 
provincial frontier with armed forces. Would the Court have declared this to be an essentially private 
act not in violation of international law? See Hans W. Baade, Nullity and Avoidance in Public 
International Law: A Preliminary Survey and a Theoretical Orientation, 39 IND. L.J. 497, 527-28 
(1964) (discussing, at 527, the concept of “Nicht-Rechtsgeschäfte” and giving the same example about 
“a declaration of war by a private individual against a state.”). Qerimi suggests that, although the 
Opinion does not think territorial integrity applies to non-state actors, it appears to believe that all actors 
must follow rules on use of force. Qerim Qerimi, comments during panel at American Society for 
International Law annual conference, March 2011. Whether or not this is the ICJ’s view, those who 
believe international law should increasingly acknowledge individuals as actors with legal personality 
will probably be disappointed by the Opinion. The Opinion can be read as staking out a substantive 
position on the rights and powers of the PISG—standing alone, its analysis of Resolution 1244 would 
seem to indicate that the lack of specific prohibitive language gave actors created under the Resolution, 
such as the PISG, broad permission to act. But this is undercut and made redundant by the emphasis on 
the private nature of the actors, which implies that the Court believes anyone acting under color of 
Security Council authority probably would have been barred from declaring independence. See 
Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 121. 
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the authors were part of the PISG or if there were any obligations on them 
as private actors, since anyone actually declaring independence would, by 
definition, have been acting outside the existing political order and not 
subject to it.174 The organs of PISG were not authorized to take these steps, 
and if they had, it would have been ultra vires, but this obvious observation 
does not tell us how we should respond. After all, the “individuals” who 
acted may not have been prohibited, but neither were they authorized: they 
were acting outside the legal order, and that, in theory, is an option 
available to anyone, even an organ established by the Security Council. 
This would have made the Security Council uncomfortable, to be sure, but 
far from avoiding this hypothetical possibility, the Court’s logic 
incidentally compels us to notice it. 
Indeed, it merely highlights that what the Court’s treatment of the UDI 
ignores is its effect on the behavior of others—the many recognitions of 
Kosovo by other states, which were in a sense based on that same 
document and private act. Many states clearly considered the act of issuing 
the UDI decisive at least for the timing of their decision to recognize 
Kosovo, and thus accorded the document a real-world effect that the Court 
entirely ignored.175 So, even if one accepted the entirely private nature of 
the UDI, this interaction of the private act with public, state action—an 
issue with which the Court was familiar176—is the obvious and essential 
heart of the dispute. 
The way the Court arrives at its conclusion again demonstrates its 
combination of procedural assertiveness and substantive vacuity. Much as 
it has done earlier, “[t]he Court considers . . . that the declaration of 
independence must be seen in its larger context, taking into account the 
events preceding its adoption, notably relating to the so-called ‘final status 
 
 174.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 121 (“The Court has already held, however. . . that the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, 
nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those 
Provisional Institutions operated. It follows that the authors of the declaration of independence were not 
bound by the framework of powers and responsibilities established to govern the conduct of the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Accordingly, the Court finds that the declaration of 
independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework.”). 
 175.  Thanks to Prof. Várady for noting this point.  
 176.  See Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 49 
(analyzing a surprisingly similar claim about the international legal relevance of ultra vires private acts, 
though not cited in the Opinion); Baade, supra note 155, at 554 (“Careful research will probably  reveal  
many  instances  where an initially private  action,  a non-act in international law, was validated through 
adoption by a state. Examples that readily come to mind are "treaties" between explorers and native 
chiefs and princes, conquest  of territory  by the private armies of the great chartered  companies. . . . 
Thus, while an act by a non-subject of international law is a non-act, such non-acts generally are 
capable of subsequent validation through ratification and adoption by a subject of international law.”) 
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process.’”177 Yet the Court’s invocation of context here serves the exclusive 
purpose of circumventing any suggestion that the UDI was issued by a 
PISG organ, in order to avoid any challenge to the Security Council’s 
framework. The UDI is not contextualized for any of the other relevant 
questions on which there is also complex evidence, such as its actual effect, 
which was the secession of Kosovo, or the responsibilities of other states in 
reacting to the UDI.178 The Court did not decide the authors were private 
actors not because that was obviously right or even the better reading, but 
because it made these problematic questions of substance go away. By 
setting up the analysis so that it would hinge upon the identity of the 
author, the Court arrived at the extraordinary—and obvious—conclusion 
that no international rule, general or specific, prevented this particular 
group of private persons from writing words that look like a declaration of 
independence on a piece of papyrus and signing it.179 
VI. ANOTHER LANGUAGE IS POSSIBLE: THE QUEBEC 
REFERENCE 
The Court is bold in asserting its jurisdiction and discretion, but timid 
in grasping the substantive question. Could it have been otherwise? Perhaps 
the matter was so fraught, so caught up in politics, as to be unanswerable 
 
 177.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 104 (referring to the factual background at paragraphs 64 to 73). 
 178.  Cf. Tarcisio Gazzini, Kosovo Advisory Opinion from the Standpoint of General International 
Law, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, at 3,  http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries 
%20PDF/Gazzini_Kosovo_Note_EN.pdf (“The crux of the matter is not whether international law 
prohibits a declaration of independence made by an entity which may develop in due time into a State, 
but whether international law imposes upon other States any obligations in relation to a declaration of 
independence. These obligations may include the obligation not to recognize the new entity, the 
obligation not to support the new entity and so on. In other words, international law is more concerned 
with the consequences of declaration of independence for other States, rather than on the lawfulness of 
such a declaration.”). 
 179.  Cf. Koroma Dissent, supra note 139, ¶ 3 (“Never before has [the Court] reformulated a 
question to such an extent that a completely new question results, one clearly distinct from the original 
question posed and which, indeed, goes against the intent of the body asking it. This is what the Court 
has done in this case by, without explicitly reformulating the question, concluding that the authors of 
the declaration of independence were distinct from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo and that the answer to the question should therefore be developed on this presumption.”); Dov 
Jacobs, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: A Voyage by the ICJ into the Twilight Zone of International 
Law, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/ 
Jacobs_Kosovo_Note_EN.pdf. (“[T]his is . . . the first opinion or judgment of the Court which does not 
deal, even remotely, with the conduct, rights and obligations of either States or international 
organizations. It deals solely with whether the actions of a group of individuals, acting (or not) as the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo or not, are in accordance with international law. 
This might seem like an obvious statement to make in light of the question put to the Court by the 
General Assembly . . . .”). 
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any other way.180 Was there any plausible alternative? There was. The 
Opinion itself cites another model suggesting that substantive boldness is 
possible—the Quebec Reference. 
In 1996, the Canadian government asked its Supreme Court if Quebec 
had the right to secede under Canadian or international law.181 The Quebec 
Court issued a 156-paragraph nonbinding opinion, itself armored with a 
considerable (and consequential) procedural apparatus, but also strikingly 
different from the Opinion in its substantive approach. The essential move 
abjured in Kosovo but made in Quebec is frankly to acknowledge the 
political—constitutive—constraints on a court’s scope for efficacious 
judgment, yet also, equally, the obligation and ability to place the question 
in its full legal and political context. The effect is a document that candidly 
engages the obvious and undeniable issues underpinning any question of 
secession. 
Consider, for example, how the Quebec Reference frames its review 
of the legal and political history—the context: 
 
Because this Reference deals with questions fundamental to the nature of 
Canada, it should not be surprising that it is necessary to review the 
context in which the Canadian union has evolved. To this end, we will 
briefly describe the legal evolution of the Constitution and the 
foundational principles governing constitutional amendments.  Our 
purpose is not to be exhaustive, but to highlight the features most 
relevant in the context of this Reference.182 
 
The Quebec Court then examines the “underlying principles” of the 
 
 180.  Cf. Eric De Brabandere, The Kosovo Advisory Proceedings and the Court's Advisory 
Jurisdiction as a Method of Dispute Settlement, Hague Justice Portal, (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/De%20Brabandere_Kosovo_EN.pdf 
(arguing that the Opinion blurred the distinction between advisory and contentious cases). 
 181.  The questions were: 
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of 
Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this 
regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the 
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession 
of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the 
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the secession of 
Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada? 
Quebec Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 2 (Can.). The Court declined to answer the third question, 
given its answers to the first two. 
 182.  Quebec Reference ¶ 34. 
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constitutional structure, including an express discussion of the uses to 
which a court may legitimately put such unwritten, pre-constitutional 
principles.183 In effect, the Quebec Court is putting its question in context 
by commenting on the entire history of Canada. By contrast, although the 
Kosovo Opinion also reviews a period of history, its discussion starts in 
1999, as if there were nothing before then that might bear on the question 
of whether Kosovo’s secession was justified. Despite its claims to the 
contrary, the Opinion is almost entirely stripped of any effort to 
contextualize—in fact, its effort is expended almost entirely in order to 
decontextualize those few facts it discusses. 
In answering, the Canadian government’s original question of whether 
or not Quebec had the right to secede unilaterally, the Quebec Court also 
indicates what it believed to be the fuller answer in context.184 It did not, in 
other words, limit itself to the question asked—but neither did it use its 
discretion to make the question still narrower. Rather, it acknowledged the 
embedded and contextual nature of the question, and proceeded to craft an 
answer to that fuller question. 
The Quebec Court finds that there is no legal prohibition of secession, 
which already goes much farther, substantively, than the Kosovo Court’s 
finding that there is no prohibition against declarations of independence—
 
 183.  Quebec Reference ¶¶ 49 ff., and ¶¶ 53-54. 
 184.  In brief, the Court held that there was no right to unilateral secession, but also that it was not 
possible simply to ignore a democratically legitimated request to secede; some form of good-faith 
negotiations were required that took account of the underlying principles of a democratic polity. See id. 
¶ 104: 
“Accordingly, the secession of Quebec from Canada cannot be accomplished by the National 
Assembly, the legislature or government of Quebec unilaterally, that is to say, without principled 
negotiations, and be considered a lawful act. Any attempt to effect the secession of a province from 
Canada must be undertaken pursuant to the Constitution of Canada, or else violate the Canadian legal 
order. However, the continued existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order cannot 
remain unaffected by the unambiguous expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer 
wish to remain in Canada. The primary means by which that expression is given effect is the 
constitutional duty to negotiate . . . . In the event secession negotiations are initiated, our Constitution, 
no less than our history, would call on the participants to work to reconcile the rights, obligations and 
legitimate aspirations of all Canadians within a framework that emphasizes constitutional 
responsibilities as much as it does constitutional rights.  
See also Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Self Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International 
Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL. 1 at 2, (2000) (using the Quebec example to argue that “self-
determination does not authorize the secession of sections of a nation from an existing state.”); Obiora 
Chinedu Okafor, Entitlement, Process, and Legitimacy in the Emergent International Law of Secession, 
9 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 41 (2002) (examining international legal entitlement to secede 
and secessionist dispute management systems); Charles F. Doran, Will Canada Unravel? Plotting a 
Map if Quebec Secedes, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 1996). See generally Pierre Bienvenu, Secession 
by Constitutional Means: Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 
21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL. 1 (1999) (discussing the background, positions, and outcome of the 
case). 
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an issue that the Quebec Court simply subsumes in the question. The 
Quebec Court also does not equate textual silence—whether in the 
Canadian Constitution or international law—with permission, since it is 
looking to engage the substantive question, rather than make it go away.185 
After observing that there is no prohibition in international law—the point 
at which the Kosovo Court stops—the Quebec Court then moves to a 
discussion of the substantive law of self-determination.186 
But far more extraordinary than its review of existing law, the Quebec 
Court notes the possibility that action in the street can overtake its opinion: 
 
No one doubts that legal consequences may flow from political facts, and 
that “sovereignty is a political fact for which no purely legal authority 
can be constituted . . . .” Secession of a province from Canada, if 
successful in the streets, might well lead to the creation of a new state.  
Although recognition by other states is not, at least as a matter of theory, 
necessary to achieve statehood, the viability of a would-be state in the 
international community depends, as a practical matter, upon recognition 
by other states.  That process of recognition is guided by legal norms. 
However, international recognition is not alone constitutive of 
statehood . . . . Recognition occurs only after a territorial unit has been 
successful, as a political fact, in achieving secession. . . . 
[O]ne of the legal norms which may be recognized by states in granting 
or withholding recognition of emergent states is the legitimacy of the 
process by which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued.187 
 
 185.  See Quebec Reference ¶ 84 (“It is of course true that the Constitution is silent as to the ability 
of a province to secede from Confederation but, although the Constitution neither expressly authorizes 
nor prohibits secession, an act of secession would purport to alter the governance of Canadian territory 
in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our current constitutional arrangements.”) This 
argument is quite similar to the Kosovo Court’s discussion of how the UDI was intended to have effect 
outside the Constitutional Framework and 1244, and represents the one point of substantive 
convergence in their discussions. See id. ¶ 144 (“If the principle of ‘effectivity’ is no more than that 
‘successful revolution begets its own legality’. . . it necessarily means that legality follows and does not 
precede the successful revolution. Ex hypothesi, the successful revolution took place outside the 
constitutional framework of the predecessor state, otherwise it would not be characterized as ‘a 
revolution.” (citation omitted) (quoting S.A. de Smith, Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary 
Situations, 7 W. ONT. L. REV. 93, 96 (1968))). For the Kosovo Opinion, this point is used to prove that 
the authors of the UDI were not acting as part of the 1244 regime, whereas for Quebec Reference, it is a 
substantive point unto itself—not avoiding a problem, but identifying the limits of judicial power. 
 186.  Id. ¶¶ 112-13 (“International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the 
explicit denial of such a right. . . . While international law generally regulates the conduct of nation 
states, it does, in some specific circumstances, also recognize the ‘rights’ of entities other than nation 
states—such as the right of a people to self-determination.”). Unlike the Kosovo Opinion question, the 
question posed to the Quebec Court specifically asked about self-determination, so it was hardly 
difficult for the Court to take it up. 
 187.  Id. ¶¶ 142-43 (citations omitted). There are several other references to the effectivity principle 
and unilateral secession in fact: the Court’s view is that this could be an efficacious act, but, by 
definition, could not be legal under the existing Canadian constitutional order. Note also the Quebec 
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This is a clear recognition of the limits beyond which the judicial 
function cannot usefully provide judgment or guidance—an exercise in 
judicial humility188—even while making extraordinarily consequential 
pronouncements. It contrasts starkly with the Kosovo Court’s approach: an 
expansive procedural reach coupled with a comprehensive avoidance of 
substance. 
The Quebec Court is guileless or craven before power. When it adopts 
a reticent approach, it is often to considerable effect, as when it explains 
that it need not decide whether the whole population of Quebec constitutes 
a legal “people,” nor what the relationship of aboriginal communities to 
that “people” might be—non-discussions that clearly signal serious real-
world consequences for Quebecois separatism.189 
 
Court’s explicit discussion of recognition—an issue at the heart of the Kosovo dispute, but which the 
ICJ chooses not to read into its question. 
 188.  The Supreme Court was itself criticized for timidity in the face of what some Canadians saw 
as treasonous behavior by Quebecois separatists. Thanks to Professor Mark Drumbl for this point. 
Despite such criticism, the Court’s approach does not seem to be an instance of retiring behind a 
political question doctrine. With the judicialization of much of political life (and international affairs), 
such doctrines have come under assault as indefensibly arbitrary or as masks for ideological preference, 
or at least as means for courts to duck hard problems. This seems different, however: Not only is the 
Quebec Court not ducking and in fact making a bold pronouncement, but its occasional reticence 
suggests deference to a different, “constitutional question” doctrine—a doctrine not about subject-
matter competence or separation of powers, but actual formational authority—something much closer to 
a Marshallian “courts of the conqueror” logic than to any fear of the political thicket. See Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) (“Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the 
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”) In the U.S. context, the political 
question doctrine is elucidated in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to 
enter this political thicket."), and limited in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (rejecting claim that 
reapportionment was a non-justiciable political question). On the trend towards judicialization, see Ran 
Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (Keith E. 
Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., 2009); see also Pros. v. Tadić, IT-94-1, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 23-5 (2 Oct. 1995) 
(rejecting the claim that the Tribunal is barred from considering its jurisdiction by a doctrine of political 
questions or non-justiciable disputes). 
The ICJ has not explicitly recognized a political questions doctrine, but has followed its logic. 
See Perez, supra note 119, at 407 (“Admittedly, the World Court explicitly denied the existence of a 
‘political question’ doctrine based on separation of powers in the Nicaragua Case. Nonetheless, the ICJ 
has employed an ‘arsenal of techniques and devices’ performing the same function as such a doctrine 
but under other names.”). 
 189.  Quebec Reference ¶ 125 (“While much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the 
characteristics (such as a common language and culture) that would be considered in determining 
whether a specific group is a ‘people’, as do other groups within Quebec and/or Canada, it is not 
necessary to explore this legal characterization to resolve Question 2 appropriately. Similarly, it is not 
necessary for the Court to determine whether, should a Quebec people exist within the definition of 
public international law, such a people encompasses the entirety of the provincial population or just a 
portion thereof. Nor is it necessary to examine the position of the aboriginal population within Quebec . 
WATERS FINAL VERSION 3(DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2013  11:09 AM 
2013] MISPLACED BOLDNESS: SUBSTANCE IN THE ICJ’S KOSOVO OPINION 319 
To be sure, the ICJ had to worry about a broader range of constituents 
than the Canadian Court, which serves a single master and was 
adjudicating a single dispute. Even though its opinion was advisory, the 
ICJ’s view would naturally be invoked for a range of disputes, and it knew 
this.190 This might be a basis for cautious judicial conservatism. Still, for all 
that, the Canadian Court also could reasonably expect that its opinion 
would have effects beyond Canada, and in any case, the Quebec opinion 
addresses the international scope of the relevant rules much more 
forthrightly.191 This cannot be because the task was any easier—if 
 
. . .”); see also id. ¶ 139). The implicit threat was that secession by Quebec would really be a secession 
by ethnic Quebecois, and areas not populated by that community—such as the north of Quebec, 
populated by Indian tribes—might not secede with it. Id. ¶ 96 (“There are linguistic and cultural 
minorities, including aboriginal peoples, unevenly distributed across the country who look to the 
Constitution of Canada for the protection of their rights. Of course, secession would give rise to many 
issues of great complexity and difficulty. These would have to be resolved within the overall framework 
of the rule of law, thereby assuring Canadians resident in Quebec and elsewhere a measure of stability 
in what would likely be a period of considerable upheaval and uncertainty. Nobody seriously suggests 
that our national existence, seamless in so many aspects, could be effortlessly separated along what are 
now the provincial boundaries of Quebec.”). See also Mark Bennett, “Indigeneity” as Self-
Determination, 4 INDIGENOUS L.J. 71, 73-76 (2005) (arguing that Indigenous secession is not practical 
in many instances); Garth Nettheim, Indigenous Australian Constitutions, 24 U.N.S.W.L.J. 841 (2001) 
(“Indigenous peoples argue that, as peoples, they are entitled to determine their political status. Some 
states oppose the notion, fearing the possibility of secession.”). Many states have recognized the status 
of indigenous peoples as peoples possessed of the right of self-determination, but of a specifically 
qualified kind that does not encompass the classical right to external self-determination (independence) 
possessed by colonial peoples. 
 190.  Cf. ROSENNE, supra note 45, at 104 (states have traditionally been concerned that advisory 
jurisdiction, if not constrained, could “authorize the surreptitious introduction of compulsory 
jurisdiction to decide concrete disputes between States by devious means”—which clearly would have 
been a risk here.); KAIYAN HOMI KAIKOBAD, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 146 (2000) (paraphrasing Judge Winiarski’s observation in a separate opinion in the UNESCO 
case that “the discretionary power vested in the Court was a way of ensuring that it was not called upon 
to give an opinion in cases where there was an actual dispute between two States one or both of whom 
had not agreed to refer the dispute to the Court”—not technically applicable to the Kosovo case, since 
the Court was taking no view on Kosovo’s statehood, but clearly the practical context); ALJAGHOUB, 
supra note 70, at 63 (2006)(“The question offered should not be narrowly defined and confined to a 
very specific point. On the other hand, the question should be phrased in such a way as to produce a 
broad answer not confined to the case initiating the question but also applicable to future cases.”). Cf. 
YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 277 
(2003)(discussing proposals to expand the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction, and noting concerns about 
“[r]eintroducing the ICJ as a mandatory global jurisdiction through the ‘backdoor’”). 
 191.  The status of the Canadian Supreme Court as the highest court of a sovereign state is clearly 
different from that of the ICJ, which is notionally the primary judicial organ of the United Nations but 
possesses little real autonomous authority. In addition, there was a substantive difference in the two 
courts’ positions vis-à-vis their respective questions: The Quebec Court was answering a prospective 
question on which it could hope to have an influence, whereas the Kosovo Court was answering a 
question effectively mooted by events—the very sort of thing, indeed, that the Quebec Court speculated 
on in discussing effectivity. It is a separate question, of course, whether irrelevance should have led the 
ICJ to produce a duller document or a more daring one. Thanks to Professor Mark Drumbl for the core 
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anything, it was far more likely that the parties in Canada would take the 
Quebec Court’s view seriously and act in accordance with it, which made 
the burden all the heavier.192 
One need not agree with the Quebec Reference’s particular views 
about secession (which are quite ambiguous, and to my mind problematic), 
but there can be no questioning the radically different tenor of its 
discussion, which is often substantive, searching and engaged—everything 
the Kosovo Opinion is not. 
The Kosovo Court plays the innocent, adjudicating matters of pure law 
in a political vacuum. We cannot know the judges’ personal views, of 
course, absent some more intimate access to their reasoning, but it is 
implausible to suppose that they were unaware of the most basic facts of 
the conflict.193 
As we have seen, the Kosovo Court expressly rejects the suggestion 
that its question was similar to the one in Quebec, and in many ways this 
was accurate, since the questions were very differently worded. The 
Quebec question was more exactly formulated, more difficult to avoid; a 
court assiduously following the text of the question would have a harder 
time avoiding substance in that case. But the ICJ has never been 
particularly fastidious about the questions it has been given—its own 
account of its jurisprudence shows as much—and so the proper question is 
why it did not do more here, when more was so clearly at issue. It is also 
true, as we have seen, that the Quebec Court played with its question, 
 
of these points. 
 192.  Anthony DePalma, Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 21, 1998, at A (“In Quebec, separatist leaders were angered by the court's opinion and said the 
will of the Quebec people, the vast majority of whom speak French, could not be overruled by any legal 
judgment. . . . Politicians in Western Canada have long pressed the federal Government to clarify the 
rules for separation and demanded that the rest of Canada be involved in any decision about Quebec's 
future. . . . Such opinions are called references, and while not legally binding, they are important 
because of the moral and legal authority of the court. The Supreme Court has issued 74 references since 
1892.”); Ottawa Begins to Adopt Plan B: (Allan) Rosk’s Supreme Court Reference Pleases Some and 
Infuriates Others, 23 ALBERTA REP. 6, 1996 WLNR 6358692, 14 Oct. 1996 (“The ruling could take a 
year or more, and while it is legally an advisory opinion, traditionally such rulings have been treated by 
Ottawa as binding. . . Mr. Bouchard's reaction to the Supreme Court reference has been to claim his 
government will not submit a ‘defence’ to the court, will ignore whatever the justices decide and, after 
holding a successful independence referendum, will declare sovereignty unilaterally. . . . ‘The leading 
political figures of all the provinces and indeed the Canadian public have long agreed that this country 
will not be held together against the will of Quebeckers clearly expressed, said Mr. Rock. ‘And this 
government agrees with that statement.’"). 
 193.  Some of the declarations and dissents expressly note the importance of pre-1999 events to a 
decision. See, e.g., Tomka Declaration, supra note 166, ¶¶ 22-30 (discussing the political background to 
the case and its significance in the outcome); Yusuf Separate Opinion, supra note 96, ¶¶ 11-13 
(discussing how Kosovo’s context allows it to be considered an “exceptional circumstance” under self-
determination).  
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avoiding some elements and introducing others—this only shows that the 
Quebec Court did not write as it did solely because it was somehow trapped 
by its question. The Court was an active agent of the question’s ultimate 
formulation in its opinion; it was not compelled to boldness. 
So there is more here than a technical rejection of jurisprudential 
homology—the Kosovo Court does not want to engage in a similar 
analysis. After all, the Court has the power to reformulate questions that do 
not engage the “legal questions really in issue;”194 so why not do so here? It 
only invokes its power of reinterpretation to narrow the issue of who the 
authors of the UDI were and to deflect proposals that the question be 
understood in a more general way—understood, that is, like the Quebec 
Reference. This is a choice about policy, one might even say, about 
courage: the courage to say more, or barring that, to say nothing at all. 
VII. THE VALUE OF NOT BEING MEMORABLE 
It will not surprise the reader that the precedential value of the 
Opinion appears to be very nearly nothing. First, as a mechanical and 
doctrinal matter, the Opinion is advisory, with no binding authority 
whatsoever.195 This engenders a certain liberating sensibility, and indeed 
the most interested parties indicated in advance of the Opinion’s issuance 
that they both had the highest respect for the Court and would not let their 
policies be altered in the slightest by its ruling.196 This was in part tactical 
positioning, but also a candid reflection of the strategic scope actors 
retained (and knew they retained) owing to the advisory quality of the 
Opinion and the limited power of the Court.197 
 
 194.  Opinion, supra note 3, ¶ 50 (citing Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 
Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 89, ¶ 35). 
 195.  See generally MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 165-71 
(1996). Under certain circumstances, ICJ advisory opinions can have binding effect, but this is an 
artifact of “some mechanism outside of the [ICJ] Statute proper[.]” Id. at 165. See also KAIKOBAD, 
supra note 190, at 221-28.  
 196.  UN Seeks Court Opinion on Kosovo, ALJAZEERA.NET, Oct. 8, 2008, 2008 WLNR 19146548 
(discussing states’ reactions to Serbia’s request); Zohar Nevo & Tamar Megiddo, Lessons from Kosovo 
the Law of Statehood and Palestinian Unilateral Independence, 5 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 89, 96-106 
(2009) (discussing history and reactions).  
 197.  Since the Court is not well-known for adopting views at odds with the political lay of the 
land, firm indication by a state that its position is fixed might be intended to encourage a certain 
mobility in the Court’s view. But this is of course speculative. On the Court’s relationship to politics, 
see RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986) (arguing that regional biases shape ICJ 
decisions); W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States Declaration under Article 36(2) of 
the Statute of the International Court, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 71 (Anthony Clark Arend, ed., 1986) (discussing anti-
American bias of the Court). But cf. Adam M. Smith, “Judicial Nationalism” in International Law: 
National Identity and Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197, 199 (2005) (“[t]he 
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A. Speculative Precedential Effects 
Still, the Opinion’s lack of binding force does not mean it could not 
have any effect in law. The Court’s views could be seen as clarifications of 
customary law on questions related to self-determination, secession and so 
on.198 As the Court itself portentously noted, “the authority of the Court as 
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations attaches to [its advisory 
opinions].”199 
And the Opinion’s effect in Balkan politics may have been 
considerable—after all, as we have seen, one of Serbia’s original purposes 
had nothing to do with the legal question, but rather was aimed at 
staunching the hemorrhage of recognitions. In this it may have succeeded: 
there have been further recognitions, but hardly the deluge Serbia sought to 
prevent. Either the risk was illusory from the start, or Serbia in fact 
achieved its goal merely by requesting an opinion. Or, of course, there may 
have been no effect either way—after all, a number of states recognized 
Kosovo between the time Serbia put the question and the Court issued the 
Opinion—this is an empirical question, but one that would be very hard to 
answer.200 In addition, Serbia and Kosovo have, in a sense, embraced the 
Opinion, having agreed to incorporate it into the so-called “footnote 
agreement.”201 
 
‘nationality’ bias of judges on the Court was never as powerful as claimed by alarmists and today seems 
to be breaking down even further”). See also Franck & Prows, supra note 178, at 242 (on the 
relationship of the Court to notions of sovereignty). 
 198.  See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-7 (4th ed. 1997)(discussing the role 
of judicial decisions in the formation of customary law). Cf. Western Sahara, ICJ rep. 1975, p. 73, 
Declaration of Judge Gros (“when the Court gives an advisory opinion. . .it states the law. The absence 
of binding force does not transform the judicial operation into a legal consultation, which may be made 
use of or not according to choice. The advisory opinion determines the law applicable to the question 
put. . . . no position adopted contrary to the Court’s pronouncement will have any effectiveness 
whatsoever in the legal sphere.”).  
 199.  Press Release, I.C.J., The General Assembly of the United Nations Requests an Advisory 
Opinion from the Court on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, I.C.J. Press Release 
No. 2008/34 (Oct 10, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/14797.pdf. See also 
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 167 (1996)(“No one disputes that 
[advisory] opinions do exert precedential influence. . . . [T]he very fact that the Court was established as 
a court of justice operated to invest its judicial opinions with the precedential force normally exerted by 
the opinions of a judicial body.”). 
 200.  See discussion supra at notes 35 and 47. One would normally expect the number of undecided 
or non-recognizing states to decrease over time (although in theory states could also withdraw 
recognition), so it is hard to make a causal claim about the question’s effects. 
 201.  Belgrade-Pristina Saved by a Footnote, NEW EUROPE ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2012, 3:10 PM), 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/belgrade-pristina-deal-saved-footnote (discussing the agreement to allow 
Kosovo representation in some international organizations, as long as it is identified with a footnote 
noting that representation is without prejudice to Kosovo’s status, and invoking both Resolution 1244 
and the Opinion). 
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The more consequential issue is whether the substantive issues 
unanswered by the Opinion were, by that very negligence, affected in ways 
that have shaped the law, whether for Kosovo or elsewhere. As Milanović 
has noted, the Opinion was designed not to be memorable.202 Content-free 
as the Opinion may be, it was widely seen as a victory for Kosovo, and 
this—combined with the absence of any formal precedential effect and the 
Court’s focus on the period of UNMIK’s administration—suggests that the 
Court may have implicitly accepted and vindicated a view advanced by one 
side in the dispute: namely, that Kosovo’s independence was sui generis. 
The position of Kosovo, the United States, and other strong advocates 
of independence was that the UDI had no precedential value because it was 
the end result of a highly particular process that included a long period of 
suspended sovereignty and international administration.203 This long period 
of international administration appears to matter to the Court’s analysis, 
and since it describes in detail the particular qualities of the UDI’s authors 
and the UNMIK administration, the Opinion could be read as accepting the 
argument that Kosovo merits independence because of these specific 
circumstances. This, in turn, could be read as indicating the shape of 
successful claims to secession in the future, and creating an exceptionally 
high threshold for them204—thus not a truly sui generis case, but a new 
rule, though in either case one that favors one substantive view of Kosovo’s 
situation. 
The Opinion says almost nothing that could tell us what this supposed 
 
 202.  Marko Milanović, Univ. of Nottingham, Panel Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, What the Kosovo Advisory Opinion Means for the Rest of the 
World 14 (Mar. 25 2011) (“[T]his Advisory Opinion does not set a precedent for any other situation. It 
was indeed designed not to set such a precedent. It is reducible to the trite statement that international 
law does not prohibit declarations of independence. The whole point of the opinion is that it is not 
memorable.”). 
 203.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, 
Secession and Recognition 12 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS § 5 (Feb. 29, 2008), 
http://www.asil.org/insights080229.cfm (discussing claims by US Secretary of State Rice that Kosovo 
is not a precedent, and opposing views); cf. UDI, Preamble (“Observing that Kosovo is a special case 
arising from the non-consensual dissolution of Yugoslavia and is no precedent to any other situation. . 
.”)(English translation appended to Written Statement of the United States of America, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf). 
 204.  That threshold would include, at a minimum, extended international administration, failed 
efforts at negotiation, some form of United Nations recognition of limits on the nominal sovereign’s 
authority, and a factually achieved independence. See David Wippmann, Univ. of Minn., Comments 
during panel at American Society for International Law Annual Conference, Mar. 2010 (developing 
idea that US policy characterizing Kosovo as sui generis was mistaken, and should instead treat it as a 
precedent with a high threshold). Claims that Kosovo had no precedential value seem untenable on 
logical grounds, but a threshold logic could achieve the same effective outcome: independence for 
Kosovo but not for other current claimants, like South Ossetia. In any event, the Court does not 
embrace either a threshold or sui generis logic; it simply does not engage the question. 
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test might be consist of: if international administration alters a sovereign’s 
hold on territory, under what conditions does this happen? This would be a 
tremendously important shift of great relevance to questions of governance, 
control of territory and humanitarian intervention. But all we could say 
with confidence would be that a thing like UNMIK, in a situation like 
Kosovo, might have an effect on a state’s territorial sovereignty. 
However, this is not the Opinion’s explicit view, only a possible 
reading: it is clear that the Opinion’s formal argument is in fact built 
precisely on saying nothing whatsoever about the effects of the UDI, or 
about self-determination, secession, or any state action in relation to 
territorial integrity whether in Kosovo or anywhere else. So there is little 
traction for the idea that the Opinion has created any legal precedents.205 
Indeed, if there were such a test in the Court’s Opinion, it would be almost 
shockingly capacious, given the Opinion’s focus on the private nature of 
the actors doing the seceding. If the Opinion says anything about territory 
and sovereignty—and there is little reason to think it does—it would 
logically mean that no secession ever violates international law and that, 
therefore, no court should or could ever declare any secession contrary to 
international law206—either a global norm of Lotus-like permission or a 
global non liquet. There is no reason to think the Court thought it was 
doing either. 
Finally, it is worth considering if the entire process of asking for, 
deliberating on, and rendering the Kosovo Opinion, however vacant and 
unseemly, is not also a victory and a vindication for the legalist project of 
taming violent politics.207 After all, many states invested considerable effort 
 
 205.  Almost all commentators on the Opinion note its lack of substance. For a view arguing that in 
fact the Court made a number of substantive contributions, see Weller, Modesty, supra note 2. Even 
Weller concedes that the Opinion is very narrowly decided. 
 206.  The few cases of independence bids being rejected that the Court discusses all involve other 
factors: Rhodesia, Northern Cyprus, and Republika Srpska. Opinion, supra note 3,  ¶ 81 (“The Court 
notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as 
regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; 
the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral 
character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected 
with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in 
particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens).”). Cf. Szewczyk, Lawfulness, supra note 167 
(“[A]n international law principle that counts and provides authority for controlling decision-making 
should distinguish between irrelevant and relevant decisions, as well as between lawful and unlawful 
actions. . . . [H]ere the Court suggests that it is a lawless world with respect to declarations of 
independence where anything is permitted unless expressly prohibited by the Security Council.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 207.  Cf. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 7-8 (2000)(discussing legalism). 
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in the ICJ’s deliberations,208 while Serbia’s resort to the ICJ was part of a 
decision—belated, probably half-hearted and almost certainly more 
practical than principled—to pursue policy goals by peaceful means, 
abjuring the more violent instruments of policy that, only recently, Serbia 
had taken up with a shocking and inhumane casualness.209And that is 
something.  
Still, one cannot escape noticing how the incentives that structured 
Serbia’s choice to go to law—the forceful, factual quality of Kosovo’s 
independence, the determined support for that independence from the 
world’s greatest military power, the European cash on the barrelhead 
backing the project, the undeniable sting of Serbian military defeat—
encourage a rather less sanguine view of Serbia’s shift, and incline us, 
instead, to see in its new policy proof that, in the affairs of human politics, 
rather less has changed than one might suppose. 
B. The Institutional Value in Avoiding Substance 
So, the substantive legal effects and precedents produced by the 
Opinion are almost nonexistent, in keeping with its formal argument. But, 
as we have seen, along the way the Opinion generates something else: a 
consistent set of claims about the Court’s interpretative prerogatives, its 
jurisdiction, and its institutional position. Repeatedly, the Opinion stresses 
the Court’s own ability to determine the parameters of the dispute and its 
dispensation: whether or not to accept a request for an advisory opinion; 
(re-)defining the question; policing the line between the General 
Assembly’s and the Security Council’s prerogatives; and at many other 
points. 
This is not unusual or unfamiliar—most of the Court’s work, whether 
advisory opinions or contentious judgments, is highly procedural and self-
referential, and shares this institutional goal. Indeed, one reason we may 
extrapolate with some confidence the nature of the broader institution from 
this single document is precisely because the Opinion is so 
comprehensively constructed out of self-referential justifications for its 
moves, interpretations and decisions.210 I have not undertaken an 
 
 208.  Cf. Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 54, at 52 (discussing the efforts states put 
into advisory opinions and arguing against dismissing the effective authority of advisory opinions). 
 209.  See supra Part I. 
 210.  Almost all of the Opinion’s legal arguments are grounded in other ICJ advisory opinions and 
contentious decisions, many of which are cited repeatedly. They include: Application for Review of 
Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1982 I.C.J. 325 
(July 20); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory 
Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65 (Mar. 30); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226(July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
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exhaustive study of ICJ jurisprudence, focusing instead on this particular 
proceeding; still, those familiar with the Court’s jurisprudence will 
recognize this introspective, recursive approach as typical.211 We might see 
a similar pattern of procedural boldness and substantive timidity in 
contentious cases, especially those, such as Bosnian Genocide or Use of 
Force in the Congo, in which military force has already been effectively 
deployed to alter factual territorial authority—the kinds of disputes for 
which the Court’s traditional deference to sovereignty is of little help in 
determining a correct or acceptable answer.212 
Asserting procedural prerogative is a strategy of weakness: 
Institutions whose authority is unquestioned do not remind others about it 
so openly and incessantly. Nor is this unique to the ICJ: the Court’s 
procedural focus—even its assiduous avoidance of substantive questions—
is not an isolated phenomenon; indeed most courts engage in this sort of 
strategic behavior to preserve their independence, scope of action, and 
institutional prerogatives.213 This institutional instinct arises out of courts’ 
 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 19); Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166 (July 12); Conditions of Admission of a 
State in Membership of the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57 
(May 28); Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J., (Ser. B), No. 5; Difference 
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 28); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Article 
17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Reports 151, 175 (July 20); Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); 
Questions of the Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 14 April 1992, 1992 I.C.J. 3; Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1 December 
1926 (Final Protocol, Article IV), Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J., (Ser. B), No. 16; Interpretation of 
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J.  73 
(Dec. 20); East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).  
 211.  See, e.g., MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE, 1946-2005, 67 (2006) (“The Court’s jurisprudence illustrates that, in giving 
advisory opinions, it is concerned about its position and role within the UN as its principal judicial 
organ.”); Perez, supra note 119, at 409. 
 212.  See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.43 (Feb. 27); Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). See 
also Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (discussing the ICJ’s reticence to 
assign responsibility for genocide to states) (on file with author); Szewczyk, Application of CERD, 
supra note 119, at 754 (“[W]hile an arbitral tribunal may be effective in allocating a border city 
between two formerly warring states on the basis of their consent to the proceedings, the vital interests 
that led to war are less susceptible to decentralized and nonhierarchical resolution in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict.”). 
 213.  CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 244 (2006)(“[T]he tradition of restraint serves to establish a 
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countermajoritarian position as decisional actors typically with much less 
democratic or popular legitimacy than political branches.214 Even very well 
entrenched, respected and powerful courts, like the U.S. federal judiciary, 
regularly resort to “the passive virtues,” avoiding or reframing certain types 
of questions to avoid unnecessary clashes.215 And, as we have seen, the 
powerful Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec Reference was hardly 
isolated from political considerations—indeed, the strength and value of 
the decision comes in part from that court’s candid acknowledgement of 
the limits under which it operates. No court arrives at a stable equilibrium 
in which, its power asserted, it rules in isolation from the political powers 
around it, and we should not expect more of the ICJ than of the great 
domestic courts. 
We can hardly speak of international democracy, yet at least some 
organs of the U.N., such as the General Assembly, are in some sense 
representative and have their own internal democratic processes, and states 
themselves are understood—often plausibly—as depositories of popular 
sovereignty. So any substantive decision the Court might have taken would 
have offended actors with considerably greater sovereign credentials than 
the Court—and, of course, considerably greater practical power.216 Perhaps 
the ICJ, in the Opinion, was simply engaging in this same sort of strategic, 
defensive behavior that domestic courts deploy—if less through a 
discretionary avoidance of hard cases and more through their reframing.217 
 
reservoir of goodwill that preserves independence norms and thereby enables the [Supreme] Court to 
uphold the law by making occasional, countermajoritarian decision without fear of retaliation.”). 
 214.  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1975)(providing the classic elaboration of the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty”). 
 215.  Id. at 111-98. (describing American courts’ deployment of “the passive virtues” as strategies 
for avoiding conflict with the political branches); see also GEYH, supra note 195 at 223-43(describing 
traditions of judicial restraint and doctrinal constraints such as justicibility, constitutional construction, 
and federalism considerations, as well as the use of docket-setting discretion to select cases; and 
discussing important cases in which the Supreme Court has retreated from conflict with other branches; 
and mentioning, at 225, the U.S. Supreme Court’s early refusal to render an advisory opinion); DAVID 
M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 164-5 (2008)(discussing 
the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting discretion and constraining doctrines). 
 216.  When the Court has undertaken to challenge power, it has gotten hurt: In the Nicaragua case, 
the “World Court put itself into a position of fundamentally damaging its relations with its most 
important constituent: the United States[,]” which withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction. THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 53 (1986). See also MICHLA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE WORLD COURT AS A ‘SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS’: DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND 
DISILLUSION 333 (1996). 
 217.  See Perez, supra note 119, at 430. Whatever other tactics the Court has adopted to defend its 
prerogatives, it has, as noted, almost never declined an advisory opinion, a “readiness based in favour of 
compliance which has appeared to detract somewhat from the discretionary element in the Court’s 
approach. . . . It is this fact which has prompted writers to suggest that the power is, for all intents and 
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Certainly the Court confronted a risk of political reaction every bit as great 
as any domestic court, and the approach it adopted in the Opinion is 
consistent with what other courts do when they fear for their independence. 
Indeed, from a close reading of the Opinion’s bold phrases, it seems clear 
that is what it did. 
At the same time, the ICJ is an institution with a considerable pedigree 
of its own, and has been engaged in this strategy for a long time.218 
Moreover, the purpose of the strategy is not solely defensive but a means to 
increase institutional power—after all, the classic expression of judicial 
avoidance is Marbury v. Madison. So, the question that should interest us 
is: to what end has the ICJ accrued its institutional capital? Because the 
cost, in this case, has been the abandonment of any effort to answer the 
substantive questions that might have made the Opinion itself memorable 
and useful. 
VIII. THE VIRTUE OF SILENCE: THE COURT’S UNILATERAL 
DECLARATION OF IRRELEVANCE 
The Opinion is an impressive display of narrow crafting, as the Court 
succeeded in providing a formal answer to the question before it without 
unnecessarily implicating other elements of law, or really almost any 
elements of law at all. Those opposed to judicial activism would be 
 
purposes, an obligatory function.” KAIKOBAD, supra note 190, at 155 (but disagreeing with those 
writers). See also POMERANCE, ADVISORY FUNCTION, supra note 95, at 277-329 (surveying objections 
to the ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction, none of which have deterred the Court from accepting questions). The 
Court’s tactical avoidance, therefore, has come from its handling of the question. 
 218.  The history of advisory opinions has not greatly enhanced “the general standing of the Court 
itself.” ROSENNE, supra note 45, at 107. The Court has in the past demonstrated an ability to act 
efficaciously through avoidance, at least in some of its contentious cases. In the Southwest Africa and 
East Timor cases, for example, the Court refrained from adjudicating certain questions, but did so in 
ways that encouraged or facilitated political dialogue within the United Nations or among member 
states. Perez, supra note 119, at 413-15 (“[T]he Court’s abstention in the South-West Africa cases is 
better understood in light of the changing balance of political power in the United Nations—a 
transformation of international politics that made the ICJ's embarking on a dialogue with the political 
organs of the U.N. likely, for the first time, to achieve an outcome that accorded with the principles of 
the U.N. Charter. . . The Court, having initiated a constitutional dialogue between the General 
Assembly and Security Council, a debate that became an international cause celebre, was in no position 
to reject the conclusions of that dialogue. Having made its Faustian bargain not to discharge its’duty to 
decide,’ the Court now was compelled to observe it.”) And regarding East Timor, id., at 422-23 (“Even 
more revealing are the grounds upon which the ICJ exercised [its] discretion. Here it seems the Court 
felt the need not to anticipate prudential judgments of the political organs. . . . [The Court’s logic] flows 
from its underlying view that the judicial role is not only to decide cases according to law but also to 
stimulate reasoned debate that ensures that the law the ICJ applies reflects the political community's 
best judgment in the application of principles to its preferred policies. The Court's reasoning thus 
implicitly invited the political organs to revisit the issue of East Timor in a more authoritative way. As 
it had in its standing decision in the second phase of the South-West Africa cases, the Court indirectly 
posed questions to the political organs of the U.N., that they might make their intentions clear.”). 
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pleased, and, indeed, from a certain point of view, this is a brilliant piece of 
judicial work serving the valid purpose of limiting judicial overreach and 
promoting dialogue over contentious, unsettled questions.219 Still, the 
combination of such restraint with repeated assertions of judicial 
prerogative suggests another, less flattering view about what the Court was 
trying to do, and what it achieved. For the Court was trying to protect itself, 
even at the cost of saying nothing about the issues that mattered.220 
All courts engage in strategic behavior, but for the rest of us, the 
proper question is not “does a court have its reasons for avoidance” but 
“what is the benefit more broadly of such a strategy?” Courts, like all 
institutions, will assert their authority and advance their own interests—that 
is to be expected—but that exercise must also benefit constituencies 
beyond the institution itself if it is to merit respect and support. If it is right 
that the strategy seen in the Opinion is consistent with a much longer-term 
approach, it is possible that its strategy has slowly begun to pay off—in the 
post–Cold-War era, the Court’s docket has become much fuller, after all, 
and the tendency of states to totally ignore ICJ proceedings has 
 
 219.  Cf. Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 54, at 50 (“This seemingly surgical 
delimitation . . . wins applause from those who seek a conservative jurisprudence from the Court that 
narrows findings to the extent possible, and derision from detractors who would like the Court to be less 
deferential to the sensitivities of sovereign states. From another angle the Court behaved in a somewhat 
political manner, deferring to geopolitical wishes by rather unexpectedly validating the Kosovo 
declaration, yet seeking to prevent wider policy effects . . . .”); Weller, Modesty, supra note 2, at 132 
(“[T]he Court was not acting as an agency mandated to illuminate legal developments in the abstract. It 
does not see itself as an agency dedicated to advancing the law or its scholarly discussion. The 
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter was shaped by the request, and so was the—narrow—focus of its 
enquiry.”); Chris Borgen, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Self-Determination and Secession, OPINIO 
JURIS (July 23, 2010, 10:15 AM) http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/23/the-kosovo-advisory-opinion-self-
determination-and-secession/ (“While the Court did take the reference, it has written an opinion in 
which it almost seems to regret having done so. It has chosen restraint and narrow readings. But better 
that than going well beyond the political will of the Member States in over-defining rules of self[-] 
determination, secession, and recognition, which may be deliberately vague (or non-existent).”). The 
United States Institute of Peace’s brief following the Opinion, which is mostly focused on the effect on 
other secessionist conflicts, is likewise largely satisfied with the narrowness of the Court’s approach in 
not reaching substantive conclusions about secession, self-determination or the UDI’s actual effects. 
See Richard Caplan, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, U.S. INST. OF PEACE Peacebrief 55, 
September 17, 2010, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB55%20The%20ICJs%20Advisory%20 
Opinion%20on%20Kosovo.pdf; see also Szewczyk, Lawfulness, supra note 167 (calling the Opinion 
“groundbreaking” and noting that “[T]he Court properly avoided definitive statements on the concept of 
remedial self-determination through unilateral secession in the aftermath of fundamental violations of 
human rights, since there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris, or other relevant sources of 
international law.”). 
 220.  Nor is this a feature of the majority Opinion alone. See Bennouna Dissent, supra note 1, ¶ 3 
(“What is at issue above all in this case is protecting the Court itself against any attempts to exploit it in 
a political debate, rather than protecting the balance between the principal political organs of the United 
Nations. . . or indeed the question of the self-determination and independence of Kosovo. . . .”). 
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diminished.221 But even if such a trend could be discerned and causally 
linked to strategies of avoidance, that still only describes an internal 
institutional benefit, not an outcome of direct relevance for any broader 
community. In the Kosovo Opinion, there is little evidence that law or 
politics was well served—that any debate was resolved, or even advanced, 
by the Court’s institutional focus. The Opinion is fully consistent with a 
keen appreciation of power, and its weakness appears fully animated by 
just such a concern: mostly, though, it is concerned with avoiding power’s 
influence on the Court, rather than on the question.222 
Had the Court reached the merits and engaged them—had it shown the 
kind of boldness that the Quebec Reference displays—what might it have 
said? It is very hard to imagine the Court declaring a right to secession as 
such—as we have seen, it is even harder to believe that the lex lata 
supports such a view—or equally that it could have invalidated or directly 
challenged Kosovo’s independence. Either way, the consequences for the 
Court could have been dire—quite possibly, a clear answer either declaring 
Kosovo’s independence valid or invalid could have meant the end of the 
Court as a functioning institution. So it is easy to conclude that the Court 
had no choice but to avoid a substantive outcome either way. And, when 
the Court has taken a more substantive role and tried to grapple with 
political complexities, as in Nuclear Weapons, the results can be 
disappointing too.223 Yet the particular outcome that the Court might have 
reached is not the point. 
We will never know what the Kosovo Court might have said, and 
while this reminds us of the marginality and unusable nature of the 
Opinion, it should also remind us of the other alternative the Court did not 
take: to adopt a candid and transparent silence. Rather than taking the case 
but saying nothing, the Court could have declined the question, on the 
grounds that there was no meaningful question here it could engage, or 
 
 221.  See INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE Webpage, List of Cases Referred to the Court Since 1946 by Date 
of Introduction, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); 
SCHULTE, supra note 53, at 436(“There is reason for cautious optimism. The Court’s prestige is at an 
unprecedented high. Even though compliance has not always been easy, there has been a marked shift 
in the attitude of parties to proceedings. Since the 1986 Nicaragua judgment, litigants have assumed a 
more respectful posture—in stark contrast to the open defiance of the Court in the 1970s. . . .”). But cf. 
SHANY, supra note 190, at 277(noting that “[o]ne of the reasons for the recent proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals has been the perception that the ICJ is ill equipped to address certain 
categories of disputes and that it is an inhospitable forum to some states.”). 
 222.  Even the defenders of the Opinion, such as Weller, Öberg, and Szewczyk, point almost 
exclusively to effects the Opinion might have on relations between the Court and other U.N. organs, or 
between the General Assembly and Security Council. Whatever value one assigns to these matters of 
institutional and procedural law; they are not the substance of the question asked. 
 223.  Thanks to Profs. Hannum and Wippmann for similar versions of these points. 
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because the substantive issues were beyond the powers of the Court to 
answer, or because the law was not clear; this was, in fact, the view of 
some of the dissenting judges. In explaining why it refused either to answer 
a defective, non-legal question or to broaden the question on its own, the 
Court could have pointed to the “passive virtues” of judicial restraint and 
the need to avoid affecting other debates, or even spelled out in clear terms 
the real political dangers the Court would face if it ruled either way—
moves that, of course, would have also signaled a reduced scope for the 
Court, but perhaps a more effective one, rather than a self-aggrandizing 
Potemkin jurisprudence. That might have provoked a more robust and 
fertile debate than the formalistic distraction engendered by the actual 
Opinion—which is to say, a real contribution.224 
This Article is critical of the Court that wrote the Opinion—that much, 
I hope, is clear—but I do not mean to dismiss the difficult political and 
intellectual circumstances in which the judges found themselves. Individual 
judges demonstrated a clear-eyed sense of the consequential issues before 
the Court.225 And without doubt, the question was as daunting as it was, 
perhaps, defective: in answering it, the individual judges faced a great 
challenge, and though I have taken up the role of critic, I doubt I would 
have done any better.226 The critique is therefore most properly oriented 
 
 224.  Cf. Timothy William Waters, Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, and Consequence at the 
Hague Tribunals: A Legal and Rhetorical Critique, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1015, 1128-31 (2003) 
(arguing for the value, alternatively of silence or candor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, whose prosecutor published an extensive set of reasons for not opening an 
investigation into NATO’s bombing of Serbia). 
 225.  The declarations by Judge Tomka and Judge Simma are good examples of this, each, in their 
way, striking directly at the heart of the insubstantial and deracinated approach taken by the Court, and 
its “unnecessarily limited—and potentially misguided—analysis.” Opinion, Declaration of Judge 
Simma ¶ 1. See, e.g., id. ¶ 10 (“For the Court consciously to have chosen further to narrow the scope of 
the question has brought with it a method of judicial reasoning which has ignored some of the most 
important questions relating to the final status of Kosovo. To not even enquire into whether a 
declaration of independence might be ’tolerated’ or even expressly permitted under international law 
does not do justice to the General Assembly’s request and, in my eyes, significantly reduces the 
advisory quality of this Opinion.”). 
 226.  The penultimate footnote is as good a place as any to note that my criticism of the Opinion 
and the Court does not mean I think the Opinion should have found against Kosovo or that I disapprove 
of Kosovo’s independence. I have purposefully not said what the Court should have said, because then, 
whatever I recommended, half my audience would find it difficult to agree. I think the legally and 
normatively correct answer is, or ought to be, that Kosovo’s overwhelmingly majority Albanian 
population had the right to form a separate state—indeed, that this right long predated the UDI and even 
the 1999 war. My views on Kosovo’s independence, and on the application of self-determination to it 
and other disputes in the Balkans, can be found elsewhere. See, e.g., Timothy William Waters, 
Indeterminate Claims: New Challenges to Self-Determination Doctrine in Yugoslavia, 20 SAIS REV. 
111 (2000); Timothy William Waters, Kosovo as Precedent and Pretext: New Debates and Old 
Lessons, JURIST, (Feb.18, 2008) http://jurist.org/forumy/2008/02/kosovo-as-precedent-and-pretext-
new.php; Timothy William Waters, “Kosovo: The Day After,” OPENDEMOCRACY, Feb. 18, 2008 
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towards the institution rather than the individual occupants of the bench. 
Individual voices found courage and clarity in dissent, but in the 
institutional context in which the Court finds itself, it would have taken 
extraordinary determination for the judges, collectively, to reach to a 
different, substantive conclusion, or to candidly acknowledge the 
impossibility of doing that. 
We need not blame the Opinion’s individual authors for failing to 
engage the substantive questions confronting them; we do better to 
consider the pressing jurisprudential, institutional, and political reasons for 
the Opinion’s narrowness and restraint. For even without censure, the 
outcome of that decisional process tells us something about the Court’s 
very limited value. Indeed, the more we find excuses for the Court’s 
avoidance—explaining it as an institutional instinct not so different from 
what domestic courts do, pointing out that, really, the Court had no choice 
but to avoid answering the hard questions, given the political realities—the 
more we must recognize that it was not some personal moral failing or 
contingent individual defect, but an institutional path and logic that 
produced this juridical nullity. The reasons why we might excuse this Court 
are, by the same token, reasons not to expect it to have anything useful to 
say in disputes like this, and therefore to question its usefulness. 
For if it has utterly abjured the issues that anyone looking at this 
case—or, indeed, at the former Yugoslavia—would care about, the Court 
has, in the Kosovo Opinion, demonstrated a singular determination to 
invest in its own institutional capital without any apparent payoff. I, for 
one, don’t think that’s worth it: finding a way to avoid all the clashing 
substantive claims in this case is an act of impressive acrobatic skill, but it 
is not the function or purpose of a court, which is to answer hard questions. 
Either of the choices the Court forewent—to address the substantive issues, 
or to speak about the reasons for silence—might have done much more to 
develop in the Court a real and efficacious authority. Either of those 
choices would also have entailed risks to the Court as well, but such risks 
come with the territory, as it were: they adhere in the nature of true 
authority, as they do in all forms of responsibility. Perhaps we ask too 
much if we expect the ICJ to speak truth to power, but it might at least 
mention its powerlessness. As Havel reminds use, that option—to 
dangerously address the world—is the path toward real and legitimate 
 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/reimagining_yugoslavia/kosovo_day_after; Timothy 
William Waters, “A Separate Peace,” NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
02/01/opinion/01waters.html?_r=1&; see also Timothy William Waters, Contemplating Failure and 
Creating Alternatives in the Balkans: Bosnia’s Peoples, Democracy and the Shape of Self-
Determination, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 423 (2004)(examining claims to self-determination in Bosnia). 
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power, and is always available to us, judges and greengrocers alike.227  
We cannot yet know, of course, if the Court’s strategy will pay off in 
the future, but it did not pay off here. The Court that wrote the Kosovo 
Opinion invested all its considerable skill and talent in producing a 
document that reminded the world of the Court’s capacity to act and 
claimed further ground for its procedural prerogatives—and then used that 
capacity to actually reduce the useful scope of the issue and answer the 
narrowest, least substantive version of the question. That looks like the 
opposite of a wise or even promising strategy for productive judicial 
empowerment—a kind of Madison v. Marbury moment, delivering nothing 
now while offering little for the future. Because the Opinion’s admixture of 
procedural boldness and substantive timidity was as unnecessary as it was 
impressive, we may read it, and perhaps reflect on its author, with a well-
deserved measure of dismissive scorn. 
 
 
 227.  HAVEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 27-39. 
